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  INTRODUCTION   
Law and emotions scholarship has reached a critical mo-
ment in its trajectory.1 It has become a varied and dynamic 
body of work, mobilizing diverse disciplinary understandings to 
analyze the range of emotions that implicate law and legal de-
cisionmaking. Conferences, academic collaborations, and even a 
number of law school seminars reflect its gradual dissemina-
tion.2 Yet mainstream legal academics have often greeted it 
with ambivalence. They have not predictably viewed it as a re-
source for addressing questions within their substantive fields. 
It is often treated as a novel academic pastime rather than an 
instrument for addressing practical problems. This reception 
contrasts sharply with that accorded two fields with significant 
overlap with law and emotions: behavioral law and economics, 
and the emerging field of law and neuroscience.3 In the sense 
 
1. “Law and emotions” scholarship explores the reciprocal relations be-
tween emotions and the law. It reflects pluralism along several dimensions: (1) 
attributes of cognition: law and emotions scholarship values the affective di-
mensions of cognition as fully as the classically rational, rather than under-
standing them as “other” or as potentially problematic departures from ration-
ality; (2) cognate literatures: law and emotions scholarship may draw on 
economics, biological science, and more objectivist social sciences, but it also 
draws on literature, history, philosophy and other humanist disciplines; (3) 
normative goals: law and emotions scholarship engages law not simply, or 
even primarily, to correct the cognitive responses of legal subjects in favor of 
greater rationality; it aims to modify law more fully to acknowledge the role of 
specific emotions, or to use law to produce particular emotional effects.  
For a thoughtful article heralding the emergence of the field which defines 
it in somewhat different terms, see Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A 
Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2006) 
(arguing that law and emotions scholarship is organized around six approach-
es: emotion-centered, emotional phenomenon, emotion theory, legal doctrine, 
theory of law, and legal actor). 
 2. See, e.g., Symposium on Law, Psychology, and the Emotions, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1423 (2000). 
 3. In their interdisciplinary exploration of dimensions of cognition that 
are not exclusively rational, these bodies of scholarship share common sub-
stantive ground with law and emotions work. They are not coterminous, how-
ever, in that some work within both behavioral law and economics and law 
and neuroscience analyzes forms of judgment, decisionmaking, cognition, or 
attributes of the mind which do not specifically involve emotion. Moreover, be-
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that all three challenge the narrow definition of rationality that 
has informed traditional legal thought, they can be seen as 
branches of the same tree or as related fields of scholarship.4 
Despite this apparent proximity, however, several factors have 
prompted a different response.  
Law and emotions work is more epistemologically challeng-
ing to conventional legal thought than those variants that have 
received wider recognition: it does not privilege rationality or 
prioritize the objectivist epistemologies that have become cor-
nerstones of mainstream legal thought. It draws on humanistic 
disciplines in addition to knowledge from the sciences and the 
social sciences. It has arrived only recently at an explicit em-
brace of normativity. And it is more plural in its normative as-
pirations: it does not aim simply to correct legal subjects’ deci-
sionmaking in favor of rationality—the primary normative 
impetus in behavioral law and economics scholarship5—but to 
modify legal doctrine to acknowledge and encompass affective 
 
havioral law and economics has, in some cases, a distinct normative project of 
moving human beings whose decisionmaking is impaired by flawed heuristics 
back in the direction of greater rationality. In noting the differential reception 
of these related bodies of work, our point is not to critique them. We use beha-
vioral law and economics scholarship in this paper, as well as in our individual 
work. Similarly, one of us is a faculty participant in the MacArthur Founda-
tion’s Law and Neuroscience Program and the other has used particular neu-
roscience works in her law and emotions writings. Our argument is, however, 
that these valuable bodies of work should not be taken to stand for the entire 
field of inquiry—into affective response or other departures from classically 
defined rationality—in mainstream legal scholarship. This pattern, as we con-
tend below, is the product of a persistent dichotomizing of emotion and reason, 
and a prioritizing of rationality as a normative goal. See infra Part II. 
 4. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1, 2–3 (2007). According to Blumenthal:  
At least two bodies of legal scholarship have recently challenged the 
primacy of the traditional rational-actor, law and economics approach 
to law and policy. The first, taking a cognitive-psychological or behav-
ioral economics approach, focuses on mental heuristics and biases 
that lead to departures from optimal or rational decisionmaking. This 
literature is voluminous and increasing. A second line of legal scho-
larship focuses on the role of emotion in legal judgment and decision-
making, whether by judges, juries, bureaucrats, legislators, or citi-
zens. Although somewhat less developed than the first, this line of 
writing, and the empirical social science research it often seeks to in-
corporate, has likewise demonstrated departures from the traditional 
conception of a rational decisionmaker. 
 5. See On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral 
Economics Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2099 (2008) 
(book review) (“By understanding the ways in which individuals are suscepti-
ble to biases and flawed decisionmaking, law and policy can help improve in-
dividual and group behavior.”). 
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response, or use law to channel, moderate, or foster the emo-
tions. From these features, mainstream scholars may have in-
ferred that law and emotions analysis is more distant from re-
cognizable modes of legal thought, less suited to recognizable 
forms of legal normativity,6 and therefore has less pragmatic 
value.7  
In this Article we respond to these doubts: law and emo-
tions is a vital field whose distinctive insights and plural me-
thodologies are essential, not simply to the full understanding 
of the role of emotions in many domains of human activity, but 
to their intelligent and responsible engagement by law. Our 
main goal in this Article is therefore to explain the pragmatic 
value of this school of thought, and enable broader application 
of law and emotions analysis to pressing legal problems. Some 
legal analysts may never be persuaded that emotions should 
become a focal concern of the law. They may prefer to view law 
as an arena that answers to the standards of rationality, draw-
ing on analyses such as behavioral law and economics to re-
spond to rationality’s limits. But for those who are prepared to 
understand emotion not simply as a departure from rationality, 
but as an affirmative mode of apprehension and response, the 
law and emotions perspective offers a way by which legal actors 
and institutions can both accommodate and influence crucial 
dimensions of human experience.  
To this end, this Article seeks to analyze the ambivalent 
legal response to the law and emotions perspective. While the 
 
 6. For a thoughtful description of the centrality of particular forms of 
normativity to legal scholarship, see Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Dis-
course of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835 (1988). This attribute of 
mainstream legal scholarship has been the subject of trenchant and inventive 
critique. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 167 (1990); Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 801 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Stances, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1059 (1991); 
Steven L. Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 963 (1991); Steven L. Winter, Without Privilege, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
1063 (1991). Although we concur in some dimensions of this critique, our point 
is that one need not embrace it in order to see value in emerging law and emo-
tions work: this work reflects more conventional forms of legal normativity as 
well.  
 7. Some readers contend not that law and emotions work lacks norma-
tive or pragmatic value, but rather that it is associated with forms of norma-
tivity that we should find threatening. Although we see this objection as less 
prevalent than the belief that law and emotions work simply fails to provide 
the kind of normative direction legal scholars and actors require, we will ad-
dress it below. See infra Part III.C. 
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recognition of emotional intelligence,8 or the award of the Nobel 
Prize to Daniel Kahneman,9 suggest a growing public apprecia-
tion of the limits on human rationality, legal analysts may be 
experiencing greater difficulty in relinquishing their rationalist 
premises. In fact, we may be witnessing a recuperation of the 
tendency to dichotomize and hierarchize reason and emotion: 
one which casts doubt not on the presence of the emotions in 
law, but on the value of analyzing and responding to that pres-
ence. Persistent legal skepticism about the emotions may also 
explain the warmer reception that has met the challenge to the 
assumptions of rationality offered by behavioral law and eco-
nomics.10 Countering this skepticism about emotions, by high-
 
 8. See, e.g., DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: WHY IT CAN 
MATTER MORE THAN IQ 33–39 (1995) (explaining how “other characteristics,” 
such as the ability to empathize with others are gaining increasing recogni-
tion). 
 9. See Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for 
Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1457 (2003) (“Utility cannot 
be divorced from emotion, and emotions are triggered by changes. A theory of 
choice that completely ignores feelings such as the pain of losses and the re-
gret of mistakes is not only descriptively unrealistic, it also leads to prescrip-
tions that do not maximize the utility of outcomes as they are actually expe-
rienced . . . .”). Kahneman received the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 
2002. Id. at 1449 n.†. 
 10. Admittedly, emotions and cognitive processes are intertwined and 
what further blurs the lines is the lack of an agreed-upon definition of “emo-
tion,” as opposed to emotionally driven behavior or decisions. Some theorists, 
for example, define emotion as the body’s response to an “exciting fact.” Ac-
cording to this understanding, fear is the lightning-quick retreat that follows 
the sight of a bear, and sadness is the tears that follow bad news. See general-
ly KEITH OATLEY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS 4–8 (2d ed. 2006) (dis-
cussing theories by Charles Darwin and William James). Such theories, which 
focus on a physiological response, somewhat decrease the gap between beha-
vioral law and economics, in which the focus is on behavior, and law and emo-
tions, in which the focus is on feelings. However, regardless of the breadth 
with which one defines emotion, behavioral law and economics tends to em-
phasize decisions rather than emotions, a fact that is reflected in the alterna-
tive names for this body of work: “behavioral decision theory” or “legal decision 
theory.” See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Re-
ply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 740 
(2000) (using the term “behavioral decision theory” (BDT) and explaining that 
BDT research has been used to identify “cognitive decision-making processes”). 
Among these processes, Rachlinski notes the use of mental heuristics, which 
“can be useful, but sometimes produce cognitive illusions that result in errors 
or biases in judgment.” Id. 
An exception that may prove the rule is the engagement of behavioral law 
and economics with the emotion of regret, which stands at the core of the sta-
tus quo bias. See Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Forma-
tion, and Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116, 117 (Cass 
R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (arguing that the known status quo bias should be un-
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lighting the patterns and contributions of law and emotions 
work, will be our primary goal in this Article. Law and emo-
tions work has great pragmatic potential, ranging from its con-
ceptualization of legal problems, through its investigation of 
the relevant aspects of emotions, to the proposal of specific 
normative legal solutions. Realizing this potential should be of 
interest to a range of legal scholars and actors.11 
In Part I, we offer a brief history of law and emotions scho-
larship, emphasizing its challenges to the assumptions of legal 
rationality, its broad interdisciplinarity, and its more recent 
turn toward a normative focus. In Part II, we examine the am-
bivalent response to this work among legal scholars, arguing 
that it reflects a renewed tendency to dichotomize and hierar-
chize reason and emotion, and a related preference for analyses 
grounded in objectivist premises. The best answer to this new 
wave of skepticism, we argue, is to demonstrate the pragmatic 
value of law and emotions work. Notwithstanding the breadth 
of its challenges to legal rationality, the affective perspective 
can contribute to the familiar normative work of the law—
revising and strengthening existing doctrine and decisionmak-
ing and informing new legal policies—as well as the less famil-
iar task of using law to improve people’s affective lives. In Part 
III, we elaborate this pragmatic potential of law and emotions 
work. We contend its value lies along three dimensions: its ca-
pacity to illuminate the affective features of legal problems; its 
ability to investigate these features through interdisciplinary 
analysis; and its ability to integrate that understanding into 
practical, normative proposals. We conclude our examination of 
these dimensions by discussing some explicit concerns that 
have been raised about legal intervention in the emotions.  
 
derstood in light of people’s efforts to avoid the emotion of regret, which they 
suspect may arise from attempting to change the status quo). Another excep-
tion is Cass Sunstein’s work on fear. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR 
(2005). Jeremy Blumenthal, who contributes to both bodies of work and takes 
a special interest in the emotions, has recently underscored the gap between 
behavioral law and economics and the emotions. Interestingly, for purposes of 
our focus, Blumenthal shares the belief that legal interventions with the emo-
tions present special difficulty. See Blumenthal, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
 11. It is interesting to compare our effort to demonstrate the usefulness of 
law and emotions against skepticism to a similar call coming from behavioral 
law and economics. See Rachlinski, supra note 10, at 742 (“If [behavioral deci-
sion theory] is to have a future in the law, law professors must find it to be a 
useful tool to address meat-and-potatoes legal issues . . . .”). 
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I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAW AND EMOTIONS 
SCHOLARSHIP   
Scholarship on law and emotions has undergone a rapid 
development, from a movement allied with feminists and other 
critical scholars in challenging legal rationality and objectivity, 
to an interdisciplinary effort aimed at exploring many dimen-
sions of human affective response.12 Most recently, law and 
emotions work has taken a normative turn, using the fruits of 
interdisciplinary exploration to argue for changes in legal con-
ceptualization, policy, and doctrine.13  
A. CHALLENGING LEGAL RATIONALITY 
Law and emotions scholarship began by arguing that emo-
tions have a vital role to play in legal thought and decisionmak-
ing.14 This radical claim confronted a long intellectual tradition 
that dichotomized reason and emotion15 and construed legal 
thought as a professionally instilled cognitive process, which 
could be powerfully unsettled by affective response.16 The de-
tachment of legal rationality reflected the historic view of law 
as a quasi-science: a process of deducing, from a framework of 
legal principles, the rule to be applied to a particular case.17 A 
detached, rationalist stance also served to insulate judges from 
pressure by the political branches18 or from undue sympathy 
 
 12. See infra notes 44, 46–53 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 46, 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 14. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, “A(nother) Critique of 
Pure Reason”: Toward Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773, 
1774 (1993) (“[W]hen emotions are acknowledged and rigorously examined, 
they can serve as a guide to deepening intellectual inquiry . . . .”). 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 1775 (“Law schools operate at the junction of the acad-
emy and the legal profession. Both realms tend to polarize reason and emotion 
and to elevate reason.”). 
 16. In this Article, we use the term “affective” interchangeably with “emo-
tional.” This draws on the definition of “affective” as “relating to, arising from, 
or influencing feelings or emotions.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DIC-
TIONARY 21 (11th ed. 2003). This is not, of course, the only way one could de-
fine “affect.” See, e.g., OATLEY ET AL., supra note 10, at 29 (defining “affective” 
as comprehending a larger domain including emotions, moods, and disposi-
tions). 
 17. See Harris & Shultz, supra note 14, at 1776 (noting that Christopher 
Columbus Langdell, “the father of modern legal education,” treated law as a 
science and legal reasoning as a deductive process). 
 18. See Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspira-
tions for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1882–84 (1988) (arguing that 
judges have always valued impartiality and independence, even when sover-
eigns sought judicial favor). 
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with one or more of the parties. 19  Emotion floods careful, 
stagewise reasoning in a tidal wave of affect; its association 
with particulars sweeps decisionmakers from their impersonal, 
Archimedean pedestal.20 Law and emotions scholars challenged 
this entrenched understanding with two kinds of arguments.  
The first was a descriptive claim: emotions already infuse 
decisionmaking whether or not they are recognized by legal ac-
tors.21 The second, and perhaps more central, argument was 
normative. Legal decisionmaking is enriched and refined by the 
operation of emotions because they direct attention to particu-
lar dimensions of a case, or shape decisionmakers’ ability to 
understand the perspective of, or the stakes of a decision for, a 
particular party. Efforts to exile affective response—a damag-
ing outgrowth of historic dichotomizing—can produce legal 
judgments that are shallow, routinized, devaluative, and even 
irresponsible. 
One setting in which scholars applied this challenge was 
the law school classroom. Scholars such as Marjorie Shultz and 
Angela Harris described and confronted the exaggerated objec-
tivism of the pedagogic environment.22 They highlighted the 
damage that can be produced when emotion is devalued or ex-
iled from the classroom,23 and the benefit that can be gained 
when emotion is acknowledged and used to illuminate unno-
ticed assumptions24 or to direct attention to norms and com-
mitments that speakers intuitively value.25  
 
 19. See id. at 1885 (“If freed from having to engage personally with what 
occurs subsequent to their judgments, judges may be enabled to impose rul-
ings that would otherwise be too painful to pronounce.”). 
 20. Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 799 
(1990) (“Often, but not always, our passions seem directed toward, or attached 
to, particulars . . . .”).  
 21. See Harris & Shultz, supra note 14, at 1774 (“[E]motions can never 
successfully be eliminated from any truly important intellectual undertaking, 
in the law or elsewhere.”). 
 22. See generally id. (advocating for an acknowledgement of emotion in 
the law school setting). Other critiques of the law school classroom made simi-
lar methodological or epistemological points, but organized them as a critique 
of the gendering of the law school classroom, rather than as a critique of its 
impoverished rationality. See, e.g., Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Le-
gal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1300 (1988) (noting 
differences in the ways in which men and women experience law school). 
 23. Harris & Shultz, supra note 14, at 1799. 
 24. See, e.g., id. at 1792 (discussing an example of a male student’s use of 
an expletive during a law seminar in an exchange about reproductive deci-
sionmaking and abortion). 
 25. See id. at 1786 (“[E]motions embody some of our most deeply rooted 
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Although the law school classroom, and even the court-
room,26 claimed the attention of some early law and emotions 
scholars, their primary focus was on the judge. This was par-
ticularly embattled territory as, in conventional legalism, the 
judge remained the legal actor, whose paradigmatic status re-
quired the separation of legal reason from emotion.27 Unlike 
“jurors [or] children,” Richard Posner famously declared, judges 
discipline themselves to respond to the problems before them 
with careful, linear rationality.28 Notwithstanding the depth 
and centrality of these mainstream commitments, early law 
and emotions scholars argued that judges not only did, but 
should, permit affective forms of knowledge to shape their deci-
sionmaking. 
In revealing and lauding the role of emotion in adjudica-
tion, these scholars drew on a varied foundation, which was 
emerging both inside and outside the law. The legal realists’ 
challenge to judicial objectivity29 had been extended by a set of 
broader epistemological challenges raised by feminist psycholo-
gists,30  philosophers,31 and legal scholars32 during the 1980s 
 
views about what has importance.” (quoting MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE’S 
KNOWLEDGE 42 (1990))). 
 26. Lynne Henderson, for example, discusses the empathic presentation of 
clients’ claims and lives in the lawyers’ briefs in cases such as Brown v. Board 
of Education, and Shapiro v. Thompson. See Lynne Henderson, Legality and 
Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1596–607, 1612–17 (1987). Justice Brennan 
discusses the effect on his decisionmaking process of the appellees’ brief in 
Goldberg v. Kelly. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The 
Progress of the Law”, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 21 (1988).  
 27. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 20, at 790 (“Given its deliberative character, 
the judicial decision may be seen as the paragon of all rational decisions, espe-
cially public ones.”). 
 28. Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE 
PASSIONS OF LAW 311 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). Resisting the siren song of 
affect has been viewed as crucial because of emotion’s inevitable intertwine-
ment with particulars: judges, as Owen Fiss has argued, must eschew res-
ponses that draw them toward specific individuals or motivations, and resolve 
cases in a detached and impartial spirit, “on the basis of reasons accepted by 
the profession and the public.” Fiss, supra note 20, at 801. 
 29. However, some heirs to legal realism have retreated toward objectiv-
ism, or formalism, in implementing the realist suggestion that law could be 
ameliorated through more systematic reliance on social policy analysis, or the 
social sciences. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. 
REV. 465, 504 (1988) (book review) (arguing that “liberal” heirs to legal real-
ism have “recreate[d] significant elements of formalist reasoning”). 
 30. See generally MARY FIELD BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN’S WAYS OF KNOW-
ING (1986) (demonstrating the incompleteness of the linear, hierarchical model 
of normative reasoning by highlighting contextual reasoning emphasizing so-
cial station in some subjects, particularly girls and women); CAROL GILLIGAN, 
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and early 1990s. Scholarship highlighting the role of emotion in 
adjudication also drew support from the published reflections of 
a handful of judges. Justice William Brennan argued in a con-
troversial article, for example, that emotion had illuminated 
the human terrain that spurred his landmark decision in Gold-
berg v. Kelly.33  
These frank testaments to the presence and potential value 
of emotion in judging provided the final incitement for legal 
scholarly intervention. A group of legal theorists—many of 
whom had helped to inaugurate feminist legal theory—
challenged the assumption that emotion was distinct from and 
 
IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 
(1982).  
 31. See generally A MIND OF ONE’S OWN: FEMINIST ESSAYS ON REASON 
AND OBJECTIVITY (Louise M. Antony & Charlotte Witt eds., 1993); FEMINISM 
AND METHODOLOGY: SOCIAL SCIENCE ISSUES (Sandra Harding ed., 1987); 
SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE?: THINKING FROM 
WOMEN’S LIVES (1991). These philosophers and historians of science mounted 
a broader challenge to objectivist epistemology, which highlighted the partiali-
ty even of ostensibly objectivist approaches, and emphasized the value of rea-
soning positionally, through so-called standpoint epistemologies. See, e.g., 
HARDING, supra, at 136–37 (discussing feminist standpoint theory). 
 32. Scholarly analysis of experiential narratives, by feminist and other 
critical legal scholars, demonstrated that highly particularistic, experiential 
arguments could be valuable sources of knowledge, not simply through the il-
luminating quality of their affective charge, but through the unacknowledged 
assumptions their insights revealed, and the distinctive lines of vision their 
experience provided. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 
CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and 
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); William N. Es-
kridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994); Marc A. Fajer, 
Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereo-
types, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
511 (1992). 
These academic developments also coincided with broader currents, from 
the migration to American shores of the varied cultural challenges of post-
modernism, see, e.g., JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: 
A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. 
of Minn. Press 1984), to the surge of interest in those emotional aspects of “in-
telligence,” which were poorly measured by traditional indices such as IQ 
tests. See, e.g., GOLEMAN, supra note 8. 
 33. See Brennan, supra note 26, at 20 (“Goldberg can be seen as injecting 
passion into a system whose abstract rationality had led it astray.”). Other jur-
ists, such as Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Shirley Abrahamson, explained 
publicly that the particularity of their own experiences, with their attendant 
emotional resonances, had been a salutary factor in their decisionmaking. See 
Resnik, supra note 18, at 1928–29 (“All my life experiences—including being a 
woman—affect me and influence me . . . .” (quoting Shirley S. Abrahamson, 
The Woman Has Robes: Four Questions, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 489, 492–
94 (1984))). 
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alien to legal reasoning. Scholars such as Lynne Henderson,34 
Judith Resnik,35 Martha Minow, and Elizabeth Spelman36 con-
tested the categorical valorization of qualities (such as detach-
ment or impartiality) associated with “reason.” Thoroughgoing 
impartiality was virtually impossible for a situated human be-
ing to achieve;37 moreover, aspiring to a stance of detachment 
could produce a failure to take responsibility for the conse-
quences of judicial action.38 In contrast, they argued, the self-
conscious operation of affective response could humanize and 
strengthen the task of adjudication, helping judges to under-
stand their daunting power and its implications for the lives of 
those before them.39  
 
 34. See Henderson, supra note 26, at 1576 (arguing that empathy aids 
processes of legal justification and decisionmaking in ways that reason can-
not). 
 35. See Resnik, supra note 18, at 1879 (“The tensions between stated ex-
pectations and practice lend an air of unreality to the articulated demands for 
impartiality.”). 
 36. See Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 
CARDOZO L. REV. 37, 45 (1988) (noting that institutions and sympathies of 
judges cannot be confined to categorizations of emotion or reason, but rather 
combine elements of both). 
 37. See Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Ex-
perience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1201, 1201 (1992) [hereinafter Minow, Bias and Impartiality] (quoting Cla-
rence Thomas during his Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearing, 
in claiming that he “stripped down like a runner” to prepare for the task of 
judging). The widespread skepticism about Clarence Thomas’s claim may be 
viewed as evidence of this conclusion. See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Supreme 
Court, 1986 Term, Foreword—Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 36 & 
n.120 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, Justice Engendered] (highlighting the au-
thor’s view of objectivity and adjudication, without explicit reference to the 
emotions, but including an argument for an imaginative identification with 
“the other”). Minow’s argument is also similar to what Lynne Henderson de-
scribes as “empathy.” See Henderson, supra note 26, at 1576. 
 38. See Minow & Spelman, supra note 36, at 56–59 (noting the insulation 
from consequences afforded to judges by not having to carry out orders made 
pursuant to their judicial power); Resnik, supra note 18, at 1922 (describing 
her Senate testimony criticizing Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork for re-
maining purposefully distant from facts relating to the concrete circumstances 
of litigants). These authors argue that a detached, objectivist stance enables 
judges to insulate themselves from moral intuitions or anxieties that might 
inform their decisionmaking process. On this point, Henderson, Minow, and 
Spelman point to a telling insight of Robert Cover’s: for judges asked to en-
force the fugitive slave law, a belief that legality required them to put aside 
individual moral qualms enabled many to enforce laws which they would have 
reviled, as a matter of private judgment. See Henderson, supra note 26, at 
1590–91 (citing ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975)); Minow & Spelman, supra note 36, at 48 (same). 
 39. Two of the most influential of these works, Passion for Justice, by Mi-
  
2008 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [94:1997 
 
These insights produced a modest, yet important, shift in 
the way that legal analysts viewed the role of emotion in adjud-
ication. By the early nineties, fewer scholars viewed emotion as 
“trespassing on territory, such as the judge’s mind, that is 
owned by reason.”40 Mainstream legal scholars increasingly be-
gan to acknowledge that emotions were not wholly alien to 
judicial decisionmaking, and emotions such as empathy could 
conceivably contribute to judicial reflection on cases.41  
Yet, this change in perception remained, in many ways, 
shallow in its conceptual penetration. Scholars admitted some 
role for more affective forms of decisionmaking without ack-
nowledging their centrality. Most remained committed to a core 
of detached, impersonal decisionmaking, though they ack-
nowledged that it could be tinged at times with infusions of af-
fect.42 The bounded character of this transformation is impor-
tant: it explains why questions about the legitimacy of 
affectively informed decisionmaking have continued to surface 
even as law and emotions analysis has proceeded in the legal 
academy. But even this partial or provisional shift in under-
standing was sufficient to launch a body of new work, and to 
send legal scholars in search of other disciplines, where analy-
sis of the emotions was already in progress. 
B. STUDYING THE EMOTIONS  
The next phase of inquiry turned from a focus on the legi-
timacy of the emotions in law to a focus on the emotions them-
selves. This movement had been occurring incrementally for a 
number of years, but it was highlighted and consolidated in 
1999 with the publication of Susan Bandes’s landmark collec-
 
now & Spelman, and On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations 
for Our Judges, by Resnik, took their bearings explicitly from these judicial 
revelations. See Minow & Spelman, supra note 36; Resnik, supra note 18. 
 40. Minow & Spelman, supra note 36, at 37.  
 41. Legal academics—along with members of the public—came to recog-
nize that judges had lives and commitments which inevitably exerted a torque 
on their decisionmaking. See Minow, Bias and Impartiality, supra note 37, at 
1203 (“[W]e want . . . judges to have, and to remember, experiences that ena-
ble their empathy and evaluative judgments.”). 
 42. Eric Posner’s treatment of the emotions as temporary departures from 
rationality that erupt in the lives of human subjects, for example, reflects this 
position. See Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1979 
(2001) (“Emotions are usually stimulated by the world, either via the media-
tion of cognition or through a more primitive stimulus-response-like neurologi-
cal mechanism.”).  
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tion, The Passions of Law.43 Bandes’s introduction stated con-
clusively the insight that many law and emotions scholars had 
begun to draw from the epistemological exchanges of the pre-
ceding years: emotion is everywhere in law.44 Thus, the ques-
tion becomes not whether emotion can have a role in law, but 
what kinds of emotions operate in particular contexts and what 
sort of a role do they play?45 Legal scholars began to study the 
emotions, often drawing on the research or insights of other 
disciplines, to answer this question.46 
In this newer work, legal scholars investigated emotions 
with greater particularity. They focused not on the general cat-
egory of affective response, but rather on a range of distinct 
and particularized emotions, from vengeance to indignation to 
mercy.47 Much of this attention was trained on the negative 
emotions that inform the criminal law.48 Emotions like anger or 
vengeance had been part of criminal jurisprudence even before 
the epistemological challenge; criminal law is one of the few 
areas of doctrine in which an examination or assessment of 
emotions (for example, did the defendant act in the “heat of 
passion” or did he demonstrate remorse?) has been a standard 
feature of the doctrinal and adjudicative landscape.49 The ex-
ploration of emotion in criminal justice helped to expand law 
and emotions scholars’ view of the contexts that constituted 
“law,” adding foci such as the jury,50 capital sentencing,51 state 
 
 43. See THE PASSIONS OF LAW 311 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). 
 44. Susan A. Bandes, Introduction to THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 
43, at 1. 
 45. Id. at 7 (“The essays in this volume move beyond the debate about 
whether emotion belongs in the law, accepting that emotional content is in-
evitable. They focus on the important questions: how do we determine which 
emotions deserve the most weight in legal decision making and which emo-
tions belong in which contexts?”). 
 46. See id. (“The essays begin from the premise that law needs to incorpo-
rate the widely shared insights developed in other fields.”). 
 47. See id. at 2 (“The law, as [the essays] illustrate, is imbued with emo-
tion. Not just the obvious emotions like mercy and the desire for vengeance 
but disgust, romantic love, bitterness, uneasiness, fear, resentment, cowar-
dice, vindictiveness, forgiveness, contempt, remorse, sympathy, hatred, spite, 
malice, shame, respect, moral fervor, and the passion for justice.”). 
 48. See id. (“In the conventional story, emotion has a certain, narrowly 
defined place in law. It is assigned to the criminal courts.”). 
 49. See id. (noting that emotions are most visible in criminal courts, espe-
cially when the death penalty is a possible outcome). 
 50. See, e.g., David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evi-
dence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 183 (2006) (studying the ways in which gruesome photographic and 
verbal evidence influences juror verdicts). 
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and federal legislation,52 and the pronouncements of public offi-
cials and advocates.53  
As legal analysts sought to learn more about the range of 
emotions they now perceived, they increasingly turned to fields 
outside the law, where inquiry into the emotions was better es-
tablished.54 One can glimpse this pattern in scholarly argu-
ments about disgust, whose role in the criminal law fueled one 
of the most vivid and extended debates in this body of work. 
William Miller’s The Anatomy of Disgust,55 a path-breaking vol-
ume in this vein, was far-ranging and eclectic in its use of 
cross-disciplinary knowledge. Miller drew broadly on litera-
ture;56 he also mined psychological, anthropological, and philo-
sophical discussions to understand the emotion of disgust.57 
Similarly, Martha Nussbaum’s challenge to the legal mobiliza-
tion of disgust analyzed a range of sources, from the poetry of 
Walt Whitman to psychological studies of disgust provoked by 
food.58 The distinguishing feature of this interdisciplinary in-
vestigation was the breadth of its aspiration, drawing on re-
 
 51. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry? The Role of 
Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599 (1998) (studying the 
role of remorse in capital sentencing); Austin Sarat, The Cultural Life of Capi-
tal Punishment: Responsibility and Representation in Dead Man Walking and 
Last Dance, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 153, 161 (1999) (analyzing representa-
tions of the death penalty in film and the connections to legal subjectivity and 
the legitimacy of state killing). 
 52. Bandes, supra note 44, at 3 (noting the emotional nature of the initial 
legislative question of what to criminalize).  
 53. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in 
THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 43, at 63, 70–71 (citing a public official’s 
statement expressing disgust for a particular offender and his crime, and de-
scribing public expressions of disgust as one of the functions of hate crime leg-
islation).  
 54. See Bandes, supra note 44, at 7 (drawing on an interdisciplinary range 
of fields such as philosophy, classics, psychology, religion, ethics, and social 
thought, in addition to law).  
 55. See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (1997). 
 56. For example, his discussion of the hierarchical character of disgust, 
and the related emotion of contempt, draws provocatively on George Orwell’s 
Down and Out in Paris and London. See id. at 243–47. 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 17, 27, 29 (noting variations by culture of what consti-
tutes disgust and citing authors such as Freud and Sartre). 
 58. See Martha C. Nussbaum, “The Secret Sewers of Vice”: Disgust, Bodies, 
and the Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 43, at 19, 23, 33–34 (dis-
cussing research by Paul Rozin on food and disgust as well as Walt Whitman’s 
Song of Myself ). Nussbaum also juxtaposed the resulting conception of disgust 
to philosophical accounts of anger and indignation to determine how each 
functioned as an expression of collective moral judgment. See id. at 26–28, 55. 
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sources as distinct as Orwell or Mahler,59 on the one hand, and 
empirical psychological studies, on the other, to create a syn-
thetic account of particular emotions that resonated with hu-
man experience.  
C. MAKING A NORMATIVE TURN  
As legal scholars interested in the emotions ventured into 
other disciplines, some brought insights gleaned from this work 
to bear normatively on specific legal questions. In the first in-
stance, these works examined the possible roles for particular 
emotions in law, or the appropriateness of specific emotions in 
particular legal contexts. Dan Kahan, reviewing Miller’s work 
on disgust, asked how the law might harness disgust to serve a 
variety of goals, from expressing the moral norms of the com-
munity, to marking the special salience of hate crimes.60 Over 
time, this focus expanded to include not simply works that con-
sidered whether and how particular emotions should play a role 
in law, but also works that asked whether and how law might 
affect emotions in a more purposive way.61 Both of these em-
phases shifted the focus from understanding emotions to work-
ing with the law. However, the latter project envisions the law 
as having a more instrumental role in shaping affective exper-
ience. Martha Minow, Laurel Fletcher, and others explored the 
 
 59. See id. at 28 (discussing the listener’s “musical experience” of the “cry 
of disgust” in the third movement of Mahler’s second symphony). 
 60. See Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1631 (1998) (“The desire to separate [others such as sex-
ual deviants or sadistic criminals] from the rest of us . . . motivates individuals 
to lash out against them in violence, and communities to punish them in ap-
propriately severe and expressive ways.”).  
 61. This normative legal work was previewed by work in philosophy, and 
elsewhere, which suggested that emotions could be produced, modified, chan-
neled, or scripted by law, among other institutional and cultural forces. Robert 
Solomon argued, for example, that law could serve the salutary social function 
of cooling, rationalizing, and satisfying the powerful emotion of vengeance. See 
Robert C. Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance: On Law and the Satisfaction of Emo-
tion, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 43, at 123, 131 (“If one purpose of 
law is to rationalize and satisfy the most powerful social passions, then ven-
geance must be considered first and foremost among them.”). Cheshire Cal-
houn has argued that legal prohibitions on gay marriage, among other social 
and cultural influences, have served to script romantic love as an exclusively 
heterosexual affair. See Cheshire Calhoun, Making Up Emotional People: The 
Case of Romantic Love, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 43, at 217, 218 
(“The deep difference between homosexuality and heterosexuality is in part 
socially constructed by imputing to gays and lesbians a psychology that makes 
them incapable of romantic love . . . .”). 
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ways that law might help contending factions move toward for-
giveness or reconciliation after mass violence.62 
In a similar vein, we recently argued that the law—in con-
texts from litigation to programs such as Head Start—can help 
to cultivate hope in people whose political or material depriva-
tion has led them toward despair.63 This more recent work has 
significantly expanded the scope of law and emotions scholar-
ship. It encompasses doctrinal areas beyond the criminal field, 
moving into areas such as family law,64 education policy,65 and 
corporate and securities law.66 It comprehends both negative 
emotions such as fear and disgust, and positive emotions such 
as love,67 forgiveness,68 and hope.69 Perhaps most importantly, 
 
 62. See generally MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVE-
NESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998) (examin-
ing legal recourse taken by societies after periods of mass violence). See also 
Laurel Fletcher, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After 
Genocide and Mass Violence, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 428, 429 (2001) (review-
ing MINOW, supra) (“The dominant view among transitional justice scholars is 
that trials and truth commissions are state-sanctioned models to heal the 
wounds of mass violence.”). 
 63. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Law in the Cultivation of Hope, 95 
CAL. L. REV. 319, 323 (2007) (“In some situations, particularly where despair 
has taken over, it may be impossible for people to conceive alternative futures 
for themselves, or see themselves as capable of creating such futures. . . . It 
may be necessary to cultivate hope through institutional interventions, includ-
ing those secured by law.”). 
 64. See Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245, 
1246 (2008) (arguing that family law should anticipate and reflect the full 
range of human emotions); Solangel Maldonado, Cultivating Forgiveness: Re-
ducing Hostility and Conflict After Divorce, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 441, 441 
(2008) (advocating for a conception of family law that “cultivate[s] forgiveness 
between divorcing parents”). 
 65. See Abrams & Keren, supra note 63, at 363–77 (analyzing the affec-
tive impact of Head Start). 
 66. See Peter H. Huang, Emotional Impact Analysis in Financial Regula-
tion: Going Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis 6 (Temple Univ. Legal Studies Re-
search, Paper No. 2006-21, 2006) [hereinafter Huang, Beyond Cost-Benefit Ana-
lysis], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=870453 
(discussing securities regulations and advocating for the use of Affective Cost-
Benefit Analysis in regulation promulgation); Peter H. Huang, Regulating Ir-
rational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities Markets, in THE LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 501, 503 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. 
Smith eds., 2005) [hereinafter Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance] 
(“Most U.S. federal securities laws focus on the cognitive form and content of 
certain information. In contrast, many investors respond emotionally to both 
the form and content of information . . . .”).  
 67. See Calhoun, supra note 61, at 217, 218 (discussing romantic love in 
the context of same-sex marriage). 
 68. See Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 37, at 14–24 (exploring 
the law’s interaction with the contrasting emotions of vengeance and forgive-
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it envisions a more dynamic and purposive relation between 
law and the emotions, reflecting both the belief that law can be 
used strategically to nurture, shape, or channel particular emo-
tions, and the awareness that law can create incidental effects 
on the emotions, which legal actors may endeavor to anticipate 
and control. 
II.  ECHOES OF THE LAW/EMOTION DICHOTOMY   
This brief retrospective may seem to offer a triumphal 
narrative of scholarly innovation and integration: a body of 
work that combines doctrinal critique, interdisciplinary in-
quiry, and normative contribution. But the reception that has 
greeted this effort within the legal mainstream suggests a more 
equivocal response. While law and emotions scholarship has 
generated intermittent interest around moments such as Jus-
tice Brennan’s challenge to legal rationality,70 it has sometimes 
been treated as more of a novelty than a pragmatic innovation, 
more of an intellectual exercise than a valuable theoretical 
perspective or problem-solving methodology. This pattern can 
be glimpsed in several different kinds of responses which we 
explore below. The incomplete embrace of this promising work 
within the legal mainstream reflects a missed opportunity, but 
it also reflects the surprising persistence of certain rationalist 
and objectivist assumptions. Conventional legal resistance to 
the emotions may not have been overcome to the extent that 
many of its critics have believed. Instead, the law/emotion di-
chotomy appears to be re-emerging in a subtler and more ob-
scure form, as a refusal not of the descriptive, but of the norma-
 
ness); see also Huntington, supra note 64, at 1300 (discussing forgiveness in 
family law); Maldonado, supra note 64, at 441 (suggesting that cultivated for-
giveness can reduce acrimony in family law).  
 69. See Abrams & Keren, supra note 63, at 344–77 (using case studies in-
cluding litigation vindicating the rights of migrant workers and the estab-
lishment of the Head Start program to demonstrate that law has the potential 
to cultivate hope). 
 70. See Brennan, supra note 26, at 3 (“[J]udging could not properly be 
characterized as simply the application of pure reason to legal problems . . . .”). 
Another interest-generating moment was the debate between Martha Nuss-
baum and Dan Kahan over the role of disgust in criminal law. Compare Nuss-
baum, supra note 58, at 19, 45 (arguing that disgust does not provide a prima 
facie case for legal regulation), with Kahan, supra note 53, at 63 (arguing that 
in the law, disgust is “indispensible” in some situations). Yet this pattern may 
be attributable as much to the visibility of the principals as to the appeal of 
the innovation offered by the larger theory. 
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tive implications of this work. This shift can make such resis-
tance more difficult to identify and critique.  
Section A explores the equivocal response to law and emo-
tions scholarship by highlighting substantive areas in which 
legal scholars have failed to recognize affective analysis as an 
important resource, notwithstanding what we view as its appli-
cability and potential illumination. Section B examines the 
more engaged reception that has greeted two interdisciplinary 
bodies of work which also highlight nonrational dimensions of 
human cognition: behavioral law and economics, and law and 
neuroscience. We argue that these patterns suggest the persis-
tence of rationalist premises in legal scholarship, as well as a 
continued commitment to certain objectivist epistemological as-
sumptions and methodologies. Section C identifies rationalist 
premises at work in two more explicit responses to law and 
emotions scholarship: first, critiques that suggest the inappro-
priateness of law as a tool for engaging the emotions; second, 
analyses that suggest that affective analysis is particularly ap-
propriate in the examination of one kind of issue—women’s re-
productive choices. We urge legal scholars to embrace a less di-
chotomous, more epistemologically heterogeneous approach to 
work that investigates the nonrational dimensions of cogni-
tion—an approach which would encompass behavioral law and 
economics, law and neuroscience, and law and emotions analy-
sis. We argue that the best way to encourage receptivity to such 
an approach in the legal mainstream is to demonstrate the 
pragmatic value of law and emotions analysis, a question to 
which we turn in Part III.  
A. UNDERVALUING AFFECTIVE ANALYSIS AS A RESOURCE 
Legal scholars have rarely treated law and emotions ana-
lysis as a resource in cases where it would seem to be well-
suited to the problems at stake. Equal protection scholars, for 
example, have largely declined the Court’s invitation to attend 
to the effect of official treatment on “hearts and minds”71 of tar-
 
 71. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate 
[children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their 
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”). This 
pattern reflects a rejection among scholars, not only of the larger anti-
subordination theory within which this affective account is nested, but more 
specifically of an affective exploration of the phenomenon of group-based sub-
ordination. But see Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and 
Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1986) (advocating for the 
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geted groups, as a means of assessing—or even understand-
ing—potential violations. Similarly, analyses of the labor re-
quired by women or people of color to assimilate into environ-
ments designed around the biographies, life patterns, or 
cultural norms of dominant groups have emphasized logistical 
or cognitive adaptations while only rarely tapping the vast—
and clearly implicated—realm of affective response. 72  While 
such emphasis may in some cases reflect the promising contri-
bution of other analytic or disciplinary lenses, it may also re-
flect the continuing hierarchization of reason and emotion: 
scholars are reluctant to communicate a controversial message 
by recourse to a stigmatized form of discourse.73  
 
adoption of anti-subordination as the dominant principal in equal protection 
disputes); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976) (arguing in favor of the group-disadvantaging prin-
ciple rather than the more formalist antidiscrimination principle as the proper 
standard in equal protection cases).  
 72. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1259, 1279–308 (2000) (offering a highly nuanced behavioral analysis 
of adaptations of people of color in mainstream work settings which does not 
explicitly address emotional labor); see also Tristin K. Green, Race and Sex in 
Organizing Work: “Diversity,” Discrimination, and Integration, 59 EMORY L.J. 
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 18–19, on file with authors) (noting the ad-
ditional time expenditures required of women and people of color in support-
ing institutional commitments to diversity by employers). This emphasis may 
be different, however, in fields outside the law. See, e.g., Sociologists Explore 
“Emotional Labor” of Black Professionals in the Workplace, WOMEN’S HEALTH 
WKLY., Aug. 21, 2008, at 504 (reporting the results of a sociological study 
which concluded that black professionals who attempt to conform to their 
white co-workers’ expectations in the workplace tend to feel “isolated, alie-
nated, and frustrated”). 
An interesting exception to this pattern, which dates back to the early 
years of law and emotions scholarship, may be found in certain examples of 
critical race feminism, which relate the experience of women of color in elite 
institutions, highlighting the often agonizing emotions that emerge in that 
context. See, e.g., Margaret Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y Grenas: 
Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 
17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 185, 197–98 (1994) (describing the elaborate practice 
of “masking” that permits people of color to assimilate into elite educational 
institutions and referring to shame that infuses those moments when the 
mask “drops”). This work largely predates the interdisciplinary inquiry into 
particular emotions, and therefore, does not undertake that form of analytic 
labor; but it vividly describes the affective costs of assimilation.  
 73. See Kathryn Abrams, Barriers and Boundaries: Exploring Emotion in 
the Law of the Family, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 301, 307 (2009) (quoting Me-
lissa Murray as remarking, ironically, that scholars in a highly gendered field 
like family law who engage in affective discourse “might as well be sitting 
around braiding each other’s hair”). Recently, however, a younger generation 
of family law scholars appears to be moving beyond this reservation. See, e.g., 
Symposium, Family Law and Emotion, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 301 (2009) 
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Yet another pattern may be found in scholarly gatherings 
or symposia examining legal issues—which are highly prox-
imate to the emotions, but which have declined to elicit or draw 
on affective analysis that might have enriched the discussion. 
Law and emotions analyses might have contributed to discus-
sions of “Fault in Contract Law”74 or “The Mind of the Mar-
ket,”75 for example, by illuminating the emotions that might 
play a role in each of them. For example, decisionmakers debat-
ing the merits of fault-based versus no-fault regimes might 
want to take into account the ways in which competing legal 
rules bear on feelings of guilt or shame among breaching par-
ties, or anger or indignation among those who claim to have 
been injured by breaches of contract. Discussions of “The Mind 
of the Market” might have benefited from work by legal scho-
lars who have explored the role of trust, guilt, and happiness in 
market transactions and their legal regulation,76 or by sociolo-
 
(including articles by legal scholars Clare Huntington and Solangel Maldona-
do).  
 74. See Univ. of Chicago Law School, Fault in Contract Law, http://www 
.law.uchicago.edu/node/1277 (last visited Apr. 25, 2010) (announcing a confer-
ence sponsored by the University of Chicago Law School and the John M. Olin 
Center for Law and Economics at the University of Michigan, which brought 
together scholars working from a variety of disciplines and perspectives). Ac-
cording to its announcement, the conference included many “other views—
some of which are strongly opposed to the economic approach,” but which did 
not appear to include the law and emotions perspective. Id. 
 75. See Harvard Law School, At HLS, a Conference on the Free Market 
Mindset, http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2009/03/17_free-market.html (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2010) (announcing a conference sponsored by Harvard Law 
School’s Program on Law and Mind Science which included perspectives from 
behavioral economics and psychology, social psychology, and sociology, but 
which does not appear to have included any perspectives drawn from the 
study of emotions).  
 76. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, 
and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 
1736 (2001) (“[T]he experimental evidence on trust sheds light on how corpo-
rate law works, by suggesting that judicial opinions in corporate cases influ-
ence corporate officers’ and directors’ behavior not only by altering their ex-
ternal incentives but also by changing their internalized preferences.”); see 
also Huang, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 66, at 4 (advocating for 
the SEC to go beyond cost-benefit analysis, “to consider emotional impacts of 
regulations”); Peter H. Huang, How Do Securities Laws Influence Affect, Hap-
piness and Trust, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 257, 261–73 (2008) (analyzing the po-
tential impacts of securities regulation on three important emotions and advo-
cating for an “accounting, inclusion, measurement, and quantification” of such 
impacts); Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1059, 1075–88 (2003) (finding that securities regulations creating fi-
duciary relationships between broker-dealers and clients create an affective 
deterrent to breaching trust). 
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gists who have analyzed the role of emotions in contemporary 
capitalism or its institutions.77 
A different, yet highly telling, example is the scholarly re-
sponse to the Court’s opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, which 
upheld a legislative ban on partial-birth abortions citing, 
among other things, concerns about the regret triggered in 
women by the abortion procedure.78 The explicit recognition of 
particular emotions as a ground for constitutional decision 
might be viewed as a kind of slow pitch over home plate for 
prospective legal analysis of the emotions. Yet surprisingly few 
scholars have swung the affective bat. Scholars already en-
gaged in work on the emotions have questioned the Court’s un-
grounded referencing of women’s regret in Carhart: Terry Ma-
roney critiqued the Court’s recourse to uninterrogated 
“emotional common sense” in adverting to women’s regret,79 
and Chris Guthrie argued that the Court neglected a rich psy-
chological literature on regret that tended to refute the dangers 
the Court foretold.80 Yet constitutional scholars, more broadly, 
have rarely considered the meaning of the Court’s foray into af-
fective terrain, or what the jurisprudence of regret imports for 
future cases.81 The failure to consider the potential contribution 
 
 77. See infra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (discussing the work of 
Eva Illouz and Arlie Hochschild). 
 78. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 128–29 (2007) (“Whether to 
have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision, which some 
women come to regret.”) (citation omitted). 
 79. See Terry Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 
62 VAND. L. REV. 851, 853–54 (2009) (“The Carhart Court explicitly prefaces 
its comments by noting that it has ‘no reliable data to measure the phenome-
non’ of post-abortion regret; instead, it presents its observations about wom-
en’s emotional experiences as ‘unexceptionable’ and ‘self-evident.’” (citing Car-
hart, 550 U.S. at 159)). 
 80. See Chris Guthrie, Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology 
of Regret, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 877, 903 (2008) (“[T]he bulk of the empirical evi-
dence on the operation of regret . . . strongly suggests that most women fare 
quite well following abortion. For these reasons, the Court was wrong to in-
voke the prospect of postabortion regret in Carhart . . . .”). 
 81. Feminist constitutional scholars have, however, analyzed Carhart’s 
threat to women’s dignity or autonomy. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and 
the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 
YALE L.J. 1694, 1701 (2008) (“[T]he gender-paternalist justification for re-
stricting abortion [in Carhart] is in deep tension with the forms of decisional 
autonomy Casey protects.”). Yet only those already engaged in work on the 
emotions have reflected on what appears to be a concerted effort—by advo-
cates of woman-centered anti-abortion analysis, if not by the Court’s majori-
ty—to script women’s emotions in the area of abortion. See, e.g., Kathryn Ab-
rams, Tribute to Professor Melvyn R. Durchslag: Exploring the Affective 
Constitution, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 571 (2009); Clare Huntington, Family 
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of affective analysis in cases where emotions are so transpar-
ently in play suggests a difficulty both in seeing and in appre-
ciating the potential of the tools that such analysis provides to 
legal critique and reconstruction.82 
B. AFFIRMING RATIONALIST AND OBJECTIVIST PREMISES 
Those forms of affective analysis which have been most 
readily embraced by legal scholars further suggest a persistent 
inclination to dichotomize reason and emotion, or objectivity 
and subjectivity. The analyses of emotion—or of departures 
from legal rationality—which have generated the greatest 
mainstream legal interest are those which adhere most strong-
ly to certain rationalist and objectivist assumptions that tradi-
tional legal thought embraces, and which early law and emo-
tions scholarship sought to challenge. We can see this pattern 
in relation to two recent bodies of work which have been em-
braced by the legal mainstream: behavioral law and economics, 
and law and neuroscience. 
1. Behavioral Law and Economics 
The earliest mainstream responses to law and emotions 
scholarship—which described emotions as momentary depar-
tures from a paradigmatic human rationality83—have been suc-
ceeded by the burgeoning body of work known as “behavioral 
law and economics.”84 This work characterizes departures from 
 
Law’s Textures: Social Norms, Emotion, and the State, 59 EMORY L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010). 
 82. A related pattern may be that of scholars doing law and emotions 
analysis yet not connecting their analysis with that body of work. See, e.g., 
Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adapta-
tion, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 750 (2007) (providing an illuminat-
ing example of law and emotions scholarship, yet refraining from mentioning 
law and emotions as one of the bodies of work to which they see their article as 
contributing). In this work, the authors describe the various literatures to 
which they aim to contribute, including “tort law literature on hedonic damag-
es,” “the wider literature on adaptive preferences,” and “behavioral realism,” 
apparently overlooking the fact that their discussions of pity, happiness, and 
pleasure place them squarely within the ambit of law and emotions analysis. 
Id. 
 83. See Posner, supra note 42, at 1978 (“[P]eople’s ‘calm’ preferences—
that is, the preferences that they have when they are not emotionally 
aroused—differ from their ‘emotion state’ preferences, which are skewed to-
ward the stimulus that provokes the emotion.”).  
 84. For a small slice of this capacious literature, see generally RICHARD H. 
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2008); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach 
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rationality not as passing occurrences, but as the products of 
flawed decisional heuristics, which are pervasive but potential-
ly corrigible. Although this work shares with law and emotions 
analyses a focus on patterns of cognition and response that de-
part from the rationality sometimes assumed by law, behavior-
al law and economics views these departures as predictable 
cognitive missteps rather than alternative modes of assessment 
or important signals of valuation.85 It documents these flawed 
heuristics by recourse to social scientific (usually psychological) 
studies that are empirical in nature.86 Furthermore, the nor-
mative interventions of behavioral law and economics, which 
may be found in a subset of this work, aim to correct flawed 
heuristics and move human beings, as choosers and decision-
makers, in the direction of greater rationality.87  
Some solutions can be classified as attempts to correct or 
eliminate an unconscious human bias, while others can be classi-
fied as attempts to harness such a bias and use it to channel in-
dividuals toward the best decisions. However, other behavioral 
law and economics scholars have been much more critical about 
the prospect of normative engagement, worrying that such ac-
tivity threatens to turn the government “into an irrationality 
monitor.”88 
 
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
207 (2006). For a lucid and lively review of behavioral law and economics with 
an eye to its prescriptive applications, see Amir & Lobel, supra note 5. 
 85. See Nussbaum, supra note 58, at 22 (“[T]he specific cognitive content 
of disgust makes it always of dubious reliability in social life, but especially in 
the life of the law.”); cf. Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk 
Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 749 (2008) (assessing varying conceptions 
of the relationship between reason and emotion and concluding that the em-
pirical data could support either an “irrational weigher” or a “cultural evalua-
tor” viewpoint).  
 86. See Neel P. Parekh, Theorizing Behavioral Law and Economics: A De-
fense of Evolutionary Analysis and the Law, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 209, 210 
(2002) (“[Behavioral law and economics]’s empirical data show that in fact 
people often do not choose the path to the highest expected payoff.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 87. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 84, at 3 (suggesting that the law 
should engage in “choice architecture,” i.e., implementing legal measures that 
correct for human deviations from rationality). 
 88. See Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies Versus Boundaries: Levels of Gene-
rality in Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1781, 1811 (2003). 
Such concerns emerge both from skepticism about the ability of legal meas-
ures to correct biases, given the limitations of the legal system, and from anx-
iety that normative efforts will put behavioral law and economics at risk of 
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It is important to note that much of behavioral law and 
economics analysis does not analyze responses that we would 
describe as emotions, but focuses rather on nonaffective cogni-
tive assumptions that depart from rationality.89 In that sense 
the domain of behavioral law and economics overlaps with, but 
is not coterminous with, that of law and emotions. The compar-
ison of the response that has greeted these two bodies of work 
is nonetheless important because both law and emotions and 
behavioral law and economics analyze departures from the ra-
tionality that has been a methodological premise, and a pre-
mise about the character of human subjects, in mainstream le-
gal scholarship. 
Behavioral law and economics thus reflects several fea-
tures which make it more accessible and less unsettling to legal 
scholars. First, it has an appealing conceptual proximity to the 
preexisting frame created by the rational actor assumptions of 
law and economics. Even as it loosens the descriptive assump-
tions of that body of work, by exposing a range of departures 
from rationality, it retains the centrality of that frame by cata-
loguing these forms of behavior as “biases” (or departures from 
rationality), a classification which reinforces rationality as the 
norm. The normative centrality of rationality is made explicit 
in those works that propose choice architecture, or other pre-
scriptive legal interventions, to move human subjects closer to 
the behavior of homo economicus.90 This ostensibly behavioral 
focus is especially compatible with the familiar vision of law as 
aiming to supervise or direct behavior, rather than to intervene 
in motives, thoughts, or feelings. 91  Finally, in its empirical 
 
“becom[ing] a political movement rather than a scientific endeavor—and its 
lifespan will probably be quite short.” See id.  
 89. See, e.g., Russel Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1228–29 (2003) (describing the endowment effect, 
wherein a subject assigns an economic value to an object she already possesses 
that is higher than what she would be willing to pay for it were she to seek to 
purchase it in the market). 
 90. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 382 
(1990) (discussing the “Economic man,” a human subject who embodies the 
assumptions relied upon by classical economists); cf. THALER & SUNSTEIN, su-
pra note 84, at 6–8 (providing a particularly evocative comparison between the 
behavior of the average person and the behavior of an ideal type they describe 
as “Econ”). Thaler and Sunstein’s goal is to use law to reduce the difference in 
behavior between the average person and Econ. See id. at 8. 
 91. The focus of normative behavioral law and economics work on beha-
vior aims to vindicate the traditional vision of law as targeting assessable hu-
man activities; it therefore appears to be concerned with verifiable, objective 
indicia. However, a closer examination suggests that many of the proposed in-
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orientation, behavioral law and economics utilizes a methodol-
ogy that can claim to be nonsubjective and replicable, features 
which are congenial to a discipline that prizes impartiality and 
retains traces of its classical aspiration to function as a 
science.92  
2. Law and Neuroscience 
Law and neuroscience (sometimes referred to as “neuro-
law” or “legal neuroscience”) is a second body of work that ex-
plores the nonrational (as well as the rational) dimensions of 
cognition. This scholarship takes a burgeoning field of research 
into the neurological bases of a range of mental states, 
processes, and operations—often drawing on new technologies 
for making visible such activities in the brain—and asks what 
this research may imply for the law. When compared to its 
neighboring perspectives of law and emotions and law and be-
havioral economics, law and neuroscience scholarship has thus 
far been engaged with a more tightly focused array of legal is-
sues, most of them relating to the criminal law (broadly defined 
to include substantive and procedural issues) and the law of 
evidence. The main discussions circle the themes of criminal 
responsibility of mentally ill, brain-damaged, or psychopathic 
adults and juveniles,93 the challenge posed by neuroscience re-
 
terventions in this literature are in fact efforts to influence the processes of de-
cisionmaking of human subjects. As such, they have the character of interven-
ing in processes that could readily be described as subjective and internal—
and therefore more comparable to motives, thoughts, or emotions. 
 92. The “Law as Science” perception is usually attributed to Christopher 
Colombus Langdell. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 109 n.22 
(1974) (“‘It was indispensable to establish at least two things; first that law is 
a science; secondly, that all the available materials of that science are con-
tained in printed books.’” (quoting Christopher Columbus Langdell, Address at 
the Meeting of the Harvard Law School Association on the 250th Anniversary 
of the Founding of Harvard University (Nov. 5, 1886))). As one of the founding 
fathers of American jurisprudence, the admired Dean of Harvard Law School, 
and the author of the first modern case book, Langdell was highly influential 
in implementing the idea. For an analysis of the connection between this ap-
proach and the rejection of emotions in the context of contract law, see Hila 
Keren, Considering Affective Consideration, 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 14–17, on file with authors). 
 93. See, e.g., Terry Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain 
Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 101 (2009) (discussing 
the criminal responsibility of minors); Peggy Sasso, Criminal Responsibility in 
the Age of “Mind Reading,” 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1191, 1193 (2009) (discussing 
the criminal responsibility of adults). 
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search to the notion of free will,94 and the role of lie detection 
and other neuroscience technologies in the courtroom.95  
Like behavioral law and economics (and unlike law and 
emotions), law and neuroscience work is not exclusively or even 
primarily focused on the emotions. Although Functional Mag-
netic Resonance Imaging (fMRIs) and related technology may 
allow neuroscientists to identify the location and/or intensity 
with which specific emotions appear as brain activity—and al-
though important scientific effort has been dedicated to the 
emotions 96 —few legal works have responded to this affect-
 
 94. See, e.g., Stephen O’Hanlon, Towards a More Reasonable Approach to 
Free Will in Criminal Law, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 395, 397 
(2009) (discussing the free will dilemma). 
 95. See, e.g., Jane Campbell Moriarty, Visions of Deception: Neuroimages 
and the Search for Truth, 42 AKRON L. REV. 739, 758–61 (2009) (discussing the 
new technologies that arguably can detect deception and arguing against their 
immediate legal adaptation). 
While the difference in the breadth of subjects can certainly be explained 
by the fact that this literature is still its formative stages, it may also be attri-
buted to the fact that the most obvious legal use of the neurosciences stems 
from its technology, which appears to lend itself to legal procedures aimed at 
detecting the truth. However, there has been controversy, even within this 
emerging literature, about whether brain scans and other visual representa-
tions stemming from neuroscience technology represent any kind of “truth” 
readily accessible by the legal system. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Law and the 
Revolution in Neuroscience: An Early Look at the Field, 42 AKRON L. REV. 687, 
707 (2009) (“People studying the ethical, legal, and social implications of neu-
roscience have to walk a tightrope . . . . We must always worry about how well 
this technology works now, under what circumstances, for what kinds of 
people, with what degrees of accuracy and confidence, and how we know those 
answers.”). There is also a related set of questions about whether triers of fact 
can accurately interpret and use brain scans and other neuroscientific images 
that may be entered into evidence. See infra notes 106–07 and accompanying 
text. 
 96. The work of Elisabeth Phelps is a prime example. See, e.g., Elizabeth 
A. Phelps et al., From Fear to Safety and Back: Reversal of Fear in the Human 
Brain, 28 J. NEUROSCIENCE 11,517, 11,517–25 (2008) (using brain scans to 
assess how the brain becomes conditioned to reacting with fear to certain sti-
muli); Elizabeth A. Phelps & Tali Sharot, How (and Why) Emotion Enhances 
the Subjective Sense of Recollection, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 
147, 147–52 (2008) (arguing that emotional experiences may distort our sub-
jective sense of the accuracy of our recollections). Interestingly, Phelps’s bias 
research has been identified as having a possible connection to law. See Gree-
ly, supra note 95, at 698 (“Could a lawyer introduce an fMRI analysis of the 
defendant in an employment discrimination case to show bias? Could criminal 
defense counsel compel an fMRI examination of the arresting police officer on 
the basis of the defendant’s assertion of bias? Will we allow, or even require, 
neuro-voir dire?”). 
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focused work.97 The normative dimension of law and neuro-
science scholarship is still largely unformulated. The few nor-
mative debates already at play ask whether and how neuro-
imaging should be used as evidence that might decide a case in 
the courts. Interestingly, a substantial number of law and neu-
roscience scholars argue against such use, at least at the cur-
rent stage of technological development.98  
Some law and neuroscience scholars have begun the ar-
duous task of mapping the possible intersections of law and 
knowledge that arise from brain research.99 Hank Greely, for 
example, recently illustrated some of the normative questions 
awaiting law and neuroscience scholars in the context of using 
fMRI technology, noting: 
Society will first have to decide whether this works and then, if it 
does work, how we want it used. Do we want its use regulated? Do we 
want employers to be able to use it? What about schools or parents? 
Do we want the police, FBI, or intelligence community to be able to 
use it? Does it matter if it is voluntary or involuntary? Should we allow 
 
 97. But see Robert E. Emery, Anger Is Not Anger Is Not Anger: Different 
Motivations Behind Anger and Why They Matter for Family Law, 16 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 346, 347 (2009) (relying in part on neuroscience research to 
show that being emotionally hurt creates pain that is reflected by brain activi-
ty which is identical to that of physical pain and, like physical pain, may trig-
ger anger); Keren, supra note 92 (manuscript at 50–51) (discussing neuroimag-
es which shed light on altruistic behavior that results from feelings of 
empathy). 
Although it may be too early to judge, the comparatively modest interest 
of legal scholars in brain research that focuses on emotions may itself support 
our argument that mainstream legal scholars are skeptical about work engag-
ing the emotions. Neuroscientists, as opposed to legal scholars, are showing 
growing interest in researching the emotions.  
 98. See, e.g., Joëlle Anne Moreno, The Future of Neuroimaged Lie Detec-
tion and the Law, 42 AKRON L. REV. 717, 725 (2009) (“[T]he science of cogni-
tive neuroscience is far from clear.”); Moriarty, supra note 95, at 758–61 (ar-
guing that researchers have not established the reliability of fMRI results to a 
threshold that would pass the evidentiary standards for admissibility in fed-
eral court). However, many legal works express high appreciation and even 
excitement about the potential of the neurosciences to change what we know 
about reality. See Greely, supra note 95, at 689 (discussing the rapid develop-
ment of the neurosciences and arguing that “knowing more about brains—and 
as a result being able to know more about minds and mental states—may fun-
damentally change, in important ways, the legal system of the United States 
and every other country in the world”); Robert Robinson, Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals and the Local Construction of Reliability, 19 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 39, 41 (2009) (“Over the next few decades, it is conceivable that 
scientists will be able to ‘see’ the genesis of a thought.”). 
 99. See David M. Eagleman, Neuroscience and the Law, 45 HOUS. LAW. 
36, 38–40 (2008) (predicting eight points of intersection); Greely, supra note 
95, at 689 (suggesting five points of intersection). 
  
2024 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [94:1997 
 
its involuntary use with a court order—a search warrant for the brain? 
Could it be used in court, and, if so, when and how? Does courtroom use 
of fMRI-based lie detection raise questions about the privilege against 
self-incrimination?100 
Although law and neuroscience is still at the early stages of 
being defined by its own participants,101 it has garnered both 
popular attention102 and widespread academic support and in-
stitutionalization. 103  Neuroscience research has also claimed 
the attention of courts.104 The appeal of law and neuroscience to 
 
 100. Greely, supra note 95, at 699. 
 101. See Jane Campbell Moriarty, Foreword to the Neuroscience, Law and 
Government Symposium, 42 AKRON L. REV. 681, 681–82 (2009) (describing the 
September 2008 Neuroscience, Law and Government Symposium as a legal re-
sponse to the rapidly growing body of research done by neuroscientists); see 
also Annabelle Belcher & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Neurolaw, 1 WILEY IN-
TERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS: COGNITIVE SCI. 18, 18 (2010), available at http:// 
www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/123216877/PDFSTART (discussing 
the debate within law and neuroscience as to its meaning and uses). For addi-
tional examples of how law and neuroscience works, see generally Owen Jones 
et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2009 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5; Amanda C. Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique 
of Neuroscience in Criminal Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183 (2009); Sym-
posium, Neuroscience, Law and Government, 42 AKRON L. REV. 681 (2009); see 
also Maroney, supra note 93, at 100 n.47 (citing some leading works).  
 102. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 
2007, (Magazine), at 49–53, 70, 77, 82, 84 (reporting on numerous legal battles 
involving the introduction of neuroscience evidence, and speculating about the 
implications). 
 103. The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation has established 
the Law and Neuroscience Project, committing $10 million over the first three 
years, to bring together faculty participants in the fields of law, philosophy, 
psychology, and neuroscience from twenty-five universities across the country. 
See The Law and Neuroscience Project, http://www.lawandneuroscienceproject 
.org (last visited Apr. 25, 2010). In addition, a number of prominent law 
schools, including Harvard, Stanford, and Vanderbilt, have established centers 
to support research at this intersection. See The Project on Law and Mind 
Sciences at Harvard Law School, http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword= 
k13943&pageid=icb.page63708 (last visited Apr. 25, 2010) (Harvard); The 
Center for Law and the Biosciences, http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/ 
centers/clb/#overview (last visited Apr. 25, 2010) (Stanford); Law & Human Be-
havior Program, http://law.vanderbilt.edu/academics/academic-programs/index 
.aspx (last visited Apr. 25, 2010) (Vanderbilt). 
 104. See Greg Miller, fMRI Evidence Used in Murder Sentencing, SCIEN-
CEINSIDER, Nov. 23, 2009, http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2009/11/ 
fmri-evidence-u.html (reporting that defense lawyers for an Illinois man con-
victed of raping and killing a ten-year-old girl used the scans to argue that 
their client should be spared the death penalty because he has a brain disord-
er). In connection with the Law and Neuroscience Project, Professor Susan 
Wolf is currently working on a database that compiles reported criminal law 
cases from 1994 to 2009, which reference neuroscience evidence, testimony, or 
argument. See Susan Wolf, Presentation at Law and Neuroscience Project 
Meeting (Jan. 8, 2010) (on file with the authors). Professor Hank Greely is col-
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mainstream legal scholars has many of the same conceptual 
sources as the attractiveness of behavioral law and economics.  
First, the exclusive focus on the brain—as the traditional 
locus (and image) of human cognition and response—accords 
with the preexisting frame of law as a rational system. Second, 
to an extent even greater than behavioral economics, neuro-
science research is based on measurable indices and replicable 
methods that confer the epistemological benefits of “hard” 
science. The use of cutting-edge technologies, such as fMRIs, 
and presentable findings such as colorful brains scans, accords 
credibility in a legal system which retains aspirations to scien-
tific objectivity,105 and helps legal actors to view such research 
as probative on questions ranging from injury to mental states 
to lie-detection.106 It seems likely that the epistemological privi-
 
lecting information and documents about every California criminal case from 
2006 through 2009 where neuroimaging evidence about the defendant was in-
troduced, or sought to be introduced. E-mail from Hank Greely, Director, Cen-
ter for Law and the Biosciences at Stanford University, to Kathryn Abrams, 
Professor, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Mar. 10, 2010) 
(on file with authors). 
 105. See supra notes 17–18, 92 and accompanying text (describing the ge-
nesis of the concept of “law as a science”). 
 106. Some research suggests, however, that legal actors may be inclined to 
accord findings based on such technology more probative value than they de-
serve, at least given the current state of technology. See, e.g., Teneille Brown 
& Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Using Functional Brain Imaging 
as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental State 56–72 (Feb. 12, 
2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). In addition, some re-
search suggests that people may defer to brain images over their own evalua-
tion of facts and values in a courtroom setting. See Anne Beaulieu, Images Are 
Not the (Only) Truth: Brain Mapping, Visual Knowledge, and Iconoclasm, 27 
SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUE 53, 73 (2002) (distinguishing the scientific purpose 
of fMRI images and how the public will interpret them); Joseph Dumit, Objec-
tive Brains Prejudicial Images, 12 SCI. IN CONTEXT 173, 174 (1999) (“The per-
suasiveness of these images might be operating on levels supplementary to the 
logic of expert argumentation. And if this is the case, then a strong argument 
can be made for their visual exclusion from courtrooms.”); Adina L. Roskies, 
Are Neuroimages Like Photographs of the Brain?, 74 PHIL. SCI. 860, 861 (2007) 
(“It is imperative that the dangers inherent in naïve public consumption of 
brain images become widely recognized.”). Factfinders may also accord more 
credit to statements by designated “experts” in trial-like situations, when 
those statements are accompanied by brain scan images. But preliminary find-
ings in a research project undertaken by Michael Saks in conjunction with the 
Law and Neuroscience Project suggest that brain scan images may not have 
the biasing effect on jurors that other work has ascribed to them. See Michael 
Saks, Professor of Law, Arizona State University, Presentation at the Law and 
Neuroscience Meeting (Jan. 8, 2010). A rich literature has, more generally, 
demonstrated the powerful effect of visual images on juror evaluation of evi-
dence. See generally Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, supra note 50. For a 
thought-provoking discussion of the “visuality” of law, see generally Carol 
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leging of scientific work has legitimated even neuroscientific 
work that delves into the emotions.107  
One respect in which law and neuroscience appears to dif-
fer from behavioral law and economics concerns its potential for 
producing normative change in pivotal doctrinal assumptions. 
Although the normative aspirations of law and neuroscience 
have yet to be clarified, it is apparent that such analysis re-
flects a destabilizing potential. For example, legal scholars 
have already remarked, with apparent fascination, on the ex-
tent to which the materialist assumptions of neuroscience—the 
notion that “we are our brains”—threatens to upend the notions 
of free will and individual responsibility that have historically 
structured the criminal law.108 Yet even given this destabilizing 
potential—an attribute law and neuroscience analysis would 
seem to share with law and emotions scholarship—the more 
potent association of law and neuroscience with rationalist and 
objectivist norms accords it higher acceptability among legal 
scholars.  
Both behavioral law and economics and law and neuro-
science may be viewed as importantly allied with law and emo-
tions analysis in recognizing the incompleteness of the tradi-
tional focus on the rational dimension of cognition, and in 
attending (to a greater or lesser degree) to affective phenome-
 
Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Pro-
tected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351 (2008).  
 107. Cf. Susan A. Bandes, Repellent Crimes and Rational Deliberation: 
Emotion and the Death Penalty, 33 VT. L. REV. 489, 492 (2009) (“[I]t has be-
come much easier to talk about emotion itself now that cognitive neuroscience 
has begun to study it. Brain imaging has given the fuzzy concept of emotion a 
comforting materiality.”). As we note above, however, the neuroscience work 
that examines the emotions has not been the focus of significant analysis 
among law and neuroscience scholars. See supra note 97 and accompanying 
text. 
 108. See Rosen, supra note 102, at 49 (“To suggest that criminals could be 
excused because their brains made them do it seems to imply that anyone 
whose brain isn’t functioning properly could be absolved of responsibility.”). 
For a less breathless account of this challenge by a pair of leading neuroscien-
tists, see Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience 
Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL 
SOC’Y B: BIO. SCI. 1775, 1784 (2004) (“Free will as we ordinarily understand it 
is an illusion generated by our cognitive architecture.”). But see Stephen J. 
Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic 
Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 397 (2006) (labeling exaggerated claims 
about the moral and legal ramifications of neuroscience Brain Overclaim Syn-
drome). 
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na.109 Law and emotions analysis, one might add, offers the ad-
vantage of giving exclusive, sustained analysis to these affec-
tive responses, while the other two bodies of work analyze them 
only on occasion (behavioral law and economics) or as one 
among several foci (law and neuroscience). Yet the warmer re-
ception that has greeted behavioral law and economics and law 
and neuroscience scholarship suggests a greater comfort with 
the rationalist assumptions and scientific methodologies re-
flected in this work. 
C. REARTICULATING THE LAW/EMOTION DICHOTOMY  
The rationalist basis of legal skepticism about law and 
emotions is also suggested by two more conspicuous patterns: 
the most explicit terms in which law and emotions scholarship 
has been challenged, and the specific contexts in which it has 
been embraced. 
The most direct form of challenge—that is, the explicit con-
cerns that have been raised about legal interventions based on 
affective analysis—suggest that legal scholars may still perc-
eive an incompatibility between law and a focus on the emo-
tions. Take, for example, the concern of Carol Sanger or Austin 
Sarat that judges and jurors instructed to attend to affective 
response may exert pressure on defendants to manifest re-
morse in the sentencing process, encouraging the strategic per-
formance of counterfeit emotions.110 Or consider Melvin Eisen-
berg’s argument that legal enforcement of emotionally 
motivated gratuitous promises will damage the “world of gift” 
and change its nature forever.111 This concern is revealing, both 
 
 109. In fact, increasing numbers of scholars may view themselves as partic-
ipating in law and emotions analysis, as well as one of these neighboring 
fields. Legal scholars such as Jeremy Blumenthal, Peter Huang, Dan Kahan, 
and Terry Maroney might fit in this category. 
 110. See Carol Sanger, The Role and Reality of Emotions in Law, 8 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 107, 111 (2001) (“[A] convicted and guilty defendant can 
put on a great show of remorse and be rewarded for the display. All of the 
players now understand the ‘proper’ emotional response and each can act ac-
cordingly.”); Austin Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment, 
in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 43, at 168, 169 (noting skepticism about 
whether legal decisionmakers can distinguish feigned from genuine remorse). 
 111. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of 
Gift, 85 CAL. L. REV. 821, 847 (1997) (“[M]uch of the world of gift is driven by 
affective considerations like love, affection, friendship, gratitude and comrade-
ship. That world would be impoverished if it were to be collapsed into the 
world of contract.”). 
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in its view of law as the heavy hand of state compulsion,112 and 
of emotion as the last outpost of human individuality, which is 
either untouched and authentic, or distorted by the demand for 
performance for legal delectation. This remedial worry—that 
law may coerce or corrupt the vulnerable, inward dimensions of 
human personality reflected in emotion—is a familiar one in 
contemporary jurisprudence. It is reflected in many struggles 
over the boundary between the public and the private, includ-
ing state concerns about entering the sacred precincts of the 
family home to address domestic violence,113 or about enforcing 
intimate exchanges.114 
The concern that law may corrupt the separate domain of 
emotion is distinct from traditionalists’ fears that ungovernable 
emotion would inflame the vaunted reason of the law.115 Yet 
both reflect a deeply dichotomous view of law and emotions. 
And each neglects the rich middle ground—which law and emo-
tions scholars are only beginning to describe—in which emotion 
infuses law with responsibility and value, and law collaborates 
with culture, or structures institutions, so as to channel, shape, 
nurture, or transform emotions of individuals or groups.116  
This latter view, that emotion is not simply an inward, bo-
dily affair, but is inevitably conditioned and directed by a rich 
array of norms, practices, and structures, has been elaborated 
upon in a growing literature on the sociology of emotion.117 In 
 
 112. In contrast, it has been our observation that law and emotions scho-
lars tend to take a broad or inclusive view of what counts as “law.” One can see 
this tendency reflected in our discussion of “integration,” where we discuss the 
variety of interventions that have been proposed or contemplated by legal 
scholars deploying this methodology. See infra Part III.C. 
 113. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Preroga-
tive and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2154–61 (1996) (analyzing Reconstruc-
tion-era cases in which courts declined to enforce criminal laws against ab-
usive husbands on marital privacy grounds). 
 114. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 491, 493, 499–507 (2006) (arguing that scholars on both sides of 
the normative debate over the extent of state regulation of economic ex-
changes between intimates underestimate how the state shapes such ex-
changes). For a critique of Hasday’s analysis from a feminist perspective, see 
Hila Keren, Can Separate Be Equal? Intimate Economic Exchange and the 
Cost of Being Special, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 19 (2005), http://www.harvardlaw 
review.org/issues/119/december05/forum_337.php. 
 115. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 20, at 800; Posner, supra note 28, at 324. 
 116. See supra Part I. 
 117. Sociology is not unique in its exploration of the ongoing social struc-
turing of the emotions. See, e.g., Calhoun, supra note 61, at 220 (describing the 
ways in which the emotion of (romantic) love is philosophically scripted by 
practices from marriage laws to popular culture). 
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her landmark 1983 work, The Managed Heart, Arlie Hochschild 
described the ways in which contemporary work environments 
structure the affective responses of employees.118 More recent-
ly, sociologist Eva Illouz has argued that the emergence of 
“emotional capitalism” has made emotions an integral part of 
the public domain, monitored by social forces and objectified.119 
Law, too, as scholars such as Susan Bandes have observed, may 
function as one of the social and institutional influences that 
directs, structures, and gives meaning to particular emo-
tions.120 These insights complicate and problematize the impli-
cit dichotomy between the heavy hand of the state and the in-
timate, authentic world of individual emotion. 
A final echo of dichotomized thinking comes not from the 
spheres that have resisted affective concerns but from one are-
na that has been quick to embrace them: the area of reproduc-
tive rights.121 Here the law has been surprisingly frank in ac-
knowledging the role of emotion, and moving directly to 
mitigate its most painful effects.122 Yet emotion here is not 
treated as a pervasive, inevitable human attribute: in a move 
reminiscent of earlier dichotomies, legal actors associate emo-
tion exclusively and restrictively with women, and they address 
it in that most feminine (or feminized) of domains—the decision 
whether to bear a child.123 This move was first introduced by 
pro-life advocates, who sought to alter public receptivity toward 
abortion by focusing on the physical and emotional well-being 
 
 118. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALI-
ZATION OF HUMAN FEELING 137 (1983). 
 119. See EVA ILLOUZ, COLD INTIMACIES: THE MAKING OF EMOTIONAL CAPI-
TALISM 4–5, 109 (2007); cf. id. at 16 (observing that the intimate sphere has 
been penetrated and transformed by a rationalist mentality traditionally asso-
ciated with the public areas of life and noting that “never has the private self 
been so publicly performed and harnessed to the discourses and values of the 
economic and political spheres”). 
 120. See Susan A. Bandes, Group Conflict Resolution: Sources of Resistance 
to Reconciliation: Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of Emotion, 72 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11–13 (2009) (arguing that expressions of grief structured 
by the formal public setting of the courtroom may be experienced differently 
by families of murder victims than expressions of grief offered in private or 
therapeutic settings). 
 121. See Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis 
of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1011 (dis-
cussing the concern for the “psychological” health of women seeking abor-
tions). 
 122. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 129–30. 
 123. See Siegel, supra note 121, at 999. 
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of women going through the abortion process.124 Groups such as 
Operation Outcry offered experiential narratives which high-
lighted the negative emotions such as regret, guilt, fear, and 
depression experienced by women who had chosen to end their 
pregnancies.125 
Although this focus on negative emotions was developed by 
actors who were not themselves lawyers, it was designed for 
and deployed in legal advocacy.126 Operation Outcry testimo-
nials, and the emphasis on harms to women more generally, 
were used to support changes in state laws, including more 
stringent informed consent requirements, and restrictions on 
some or all forms of abortion.127 This approach to women’s emo-
tions received its most salient form of support in Gonzales v. 
Carhart.128 In upholding a federal ban on partial-birth abor-
tions, the majority observed: “[w]hile we find no reliable data to 
measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude 
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life 
 
 124. Id. at 1009 (describing this development for legal audiences and theo-
rizing the factors that render it constitutionally problematic).  
 125. Operation Outcry, http://www.operationoutcry.org/pages.asp?pageid= 
27784 (last visited Apr. 25, 2010) (“Operation Outcry is the ministry of the 
Justice Foundation to end the pain of abortion by exposing the truth about its 
devastating impact on women, men and families.”) The Justice Foundation of-
fers pro bono legal support for conservative political litigation. See The Justice 
Foundation, http://www.thejusticefoundation.org/pages.asp?pageid=22827 (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2010). Contra A. Kero et al., Wellbeing and Mental Growth—
Longterm Effects of Legal Abortion, 58 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2259, 2259–60 (2004) 
(citing a range of studies most of which found a prevalence of positive emo-
tions, such as relief or a sense of responsibility, following abortion). 
 126. See Operation Outcry, supra note 125 (describing the use of evidence 
of the “tragic and harmful effects of abortion” in legal cases). 
 127. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 121, at 1027 n.150 (describing an informed 
consent statute in South Dakota supported by David Reardon that was sub-
mitted to the legislature, which was “[a]n Act to define the applicable standard 
of care in regard to screening of risk factors for all abortions except in the case 
of a medical emergency, to provide civil remedies, and to exempt medical 
emergencies from the requirements of this Act”). The Reardon bill was later 
tabled in favor of the ban statute. See id. at 1024 n.137. 
 128. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); see also Brief of Sandra Ca-
no et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 
05-380) [hereinafter Cano Brief ] (using Operation Outcry narratives and simi-
lar woman-centered argumentation); Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, 
The Big News About Gonzales v. Carhart—It’s the Informed Consent, Stupid, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/04/big-news-about-gonzales-v-carhart.html (Apr. 
19, 2007 14:50 EST) (referring to the constitutional prioritizing of post-
abortion regret as “the big news” about the case). 
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they once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of 
esteem can follow.”129  
These arguments dovetail with earlier explorations of fear 
in the context of spousal notification130 to create a significant 
legal emphasis on women’s affective experience in the exercise 
of reproductive rights. This perpetuates one of the most famili-
ar of the dichotomized tropes of objectivism: the association of 
partiality, emotion, and their excesses, with women. Emotion—
where it has been most forthrightly acknowledged in recent le-
gal argumentation—is a force that besets and infantilizes wom-
en; it authorizes a highly paternalistic and restrictive state re-
sponse.131 Affective responses to abortion which reflect women’s 
autonomy or independence—such as relief, happiness, or a 
sense of having exercised responsibility for one’s life132—are 
consistently neglected in this doctrine in favor of those that re-
flect ambivalence, dependency, and a stereotypic maternal-
ism.133 This is hardly an auspicious beginning for judicial and 
broader legal recognition of the emotions.  
These examples suggest that law and emotions scholars 
may have been too quick to infer that our challenges to the di-
chotomy between reason and emotions have transformed domi-
nant conceptions of legal rationality.134 The skepticism about 
whether even self-consciously normative forms of law and emo-
tions scholarship have anything practical to offer; the gravita-
 
 129. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (citing Cano Brief, supra note 128, at 22–24). 
 130. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 971–76 (1992). 
 131. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 181–83 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (observing 
that if legal actors were genuinely concerned about women’s regret, they 
would try to enhance the informational grounding of women’s choice, rather 
than depriving them of such choice).  
 132. Cf. Nancy E. Adler et al., Psychological Factors in Abortion: A Review, 
47 AM. PSYCHOL. 1194, 1198 (1992) (noting that while women respond to abor-
tion with mixed emotions, “relief and happiness” are the most frequently re-
ported emotions); Kero et al., supra note 125 (citing relief and a sense of re-
sponsibility as primary affective responses to abortion). 
 133. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (“Respect for human life finds an ulti-
mate expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child.”). The ma-
ternalism implicit in this quote can be better appreciated by reflecting on the 
fact that it is being offered in the context of a discussion of abortion, a setting 
in which the woman exercising her reproductive choice does not wish to be-
come a mother, and may not consider the fetus she has chosen to abort to be 
“her child.”  
 134. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 44, at 14 (“The essays in this volume 
make it impossible to think of law as a solely cognitive, emotionless zone 
again.” (emphasis added)). This suggests some optimism that the tendency to 
dichotomize law and emotions has eroded. 
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tion toward more scientific approaches to analyzing the emo-
tions; and the co-optation of affective analysis by forms of legal 
advocacy which seek to associate it exclusively, and restrictive-
ly, with women, all suggest that we may be facing a recupera-
tion of the traditional dichotomous, hierarchical view of reason 
and emotion. This iteration, while allowing for the possibility of 
emotions in the general orbit of the law, resists law and emo-
tions analysis at just that point at which it seeks to gain prac-
tical purchase. It challenges not the possibility or coherence of 
affective analysis in the general context of the law, but its utili-
ty as a valuable alternative response to practical legal problems: 
as a rubric, language, or organizing frame for legal interven-
tion. Analysis of emotions, in other words, may be helpful in 
explaining the lives of vacillating, suffering women, but not in 
directing the work of deliberative legal actors.  
The growing awareness that human beings are capable on-
ly of bounded rationality has led to a wave of multidisciplinary 
inquiries into the nonrational dimensions of cognition, percep-
tion, and response.135 This awareness and the transformative 
body of work it has produced demand a more venturesome and 
plural response by legal scholars. To fully comprehend the 
many challenges to human rationality and their potential im-
pact on the law, legal scholars should draw on all bodies of in-
quiry that have the potential to illuminate law’s engagement 
with the nonrational dimensions of human experience. Un-
doubtedly, we need the work of behavioral economics to analyze 
flawed heuristics, and create “choice architecture” that facili-
tates rational decisionmaking.136  
Similarly, we need neuroscience to help us understand the 
brain mechanisms that shape the human cognition and its limi-
tations, and to glimpse the ways in which these patterns might 
be germane to legal decisionmaking.137 But, despite the ration-
alist and objectivist premises that continue to ground legal in-
stincts, we also need a broader and more diverse set of re-
sources from disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, 
psychology, cultural studies, philosophy, and literature. Those 
bodies of knowledge will help us think about emotions not 
simply as temporary deviations from rationality (behavioral 
studies) or as forms of neural function (brain studies), but also, 
at times, as distinct and significant supplemental means of ap-
 
 135. See supra notes 9–10, 57 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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prehending the world.138 They will also help us develop a con-
ception of law as a vehicle for attending, accommodating, and 
engaging in a variety of pragmatic ways these fundamental di-
mensions of human response. Achieving this final goal in the 
context of persisting rationalist tendencies will require, in turn, 
a different kind of response from law and emotions scholars. It 
will require that we demonstrate not the pervasiveness of the 
emotions within law, but rather the utility of analyzing the 
emotions in responding to concrete legal problems.139 It is to 
this challenge that we now turn.  
III.  THREE DIMENSIONS OF USEFULNESS   
The ambivalent reception of law and emotions scholarship 
stands at sharp odds with its pragmatic potential. Therefore, 
this Part aims to offer an analysis of law and emotions scholar-
ship that explicates the tools it provides for responding to legal 
problems. We argue this scholarship has demonstrated three 
“dimensions” which can inform both the more modest end of 
improving legal doctrine, and the more ambitious aspiration of 
using law to produce desirable emotional effects. In this Part, 
we mark these three dimensions with the terms Illumination, 
Investigation, and Integration. The first dimension, “Illumina-
 
 138. Cf. NUSSBAUM, supra note 25, at 3 (arguing that philosophic inquiry 
into ethical questions—how we should live our lives—stands to gain from the 
study of literature). Nussbaum maintains that literature offers a different way 
of illuminating and exploring conflicts of value: it emphasizes ethical insights 
gained from emotions, as well as the importance of particulars, uncontrolled 
happenings, and human relationships in aiding perception and shaping hu-
man affairs). Id. Nussbaum’s claims about literature as a distinct way of ap-
prehending the world and the normative choices it presents have important 
overlap with the claims that humanistic law and emotions scholars make for 
emotion: that it is not a diminished or defective form of rationality, but, on the 
contrary, that it is capable of supplementing rational insights with different 
modes of perception and understanding. Id. at 53. 
 139. Cf. Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835, 1839 
(2005) (drawing from Plato’s Republic, Phaedrus, and Laws for the two de-
fenses of the poet’s role in the city). Yoshino uses this “Platonic paradigm” to 
assess the suitability and contribution of certain examples of “law and litera-
ture” work to the body of legal scholarship. Id. at 1859–60. The two possible 
defenses are “ineradicability,” that poetry inevitably reemerges in the city be-
cause it is indistinguishable from philosophy and other discourses appropriate 
to political life, and “virtue,” that poetry “has the capacity to serve, rather 
than merely to subvert, the proper ends of the state.” Id. at 1839. This analy-
sis has much to offer the discussion of law and emotions, because, as Yoshino 
points out, much of the discussion of the defects of poetry in relation to the city 
concerns the defects of emotion in relation to reason. See id. at 1846–47, 1855–
57. 
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tion,” stands for the task of highlighting the often unacknow-
ledged way that emotions are implicated in a particular legal 
setting. The second, “Investigation,” reflects the interdiscipli-
nary effort to better understand the nature and characteristics 
of the specific emotions at issue. The third, “Integration,” 
represents the challenge of incorporating the new affective in-
sights gleaned through this effort into normative suggestions 
for legal change. Not every example of law and emotions scho-
larship encompasses each of these dimensions. Yet, particularly 
in the context of resurgent legal resistance to emotions, it is 
important to recognize that the most fully realized forms of this 
scholarship, and the aspirations of this body of scholarship as a 
whole, reflect all three.  
A. ILLUMINATION 
The “illumination” dimension has at its core the observa-
tion of specific legal issues through the new prism of the emo-
tions. As law and economics works revisit legal problems from 
the perspective of costs and benefits, and feminist projects ex-
amine legal matters from the perspective of women’s exper-
iences, or of gender bifurcation or subordination, law and emo-
tions scholarship embodies a particular lens: an affective 
standpoint. Examining law from the perspective of the emo-
tions is not, however, a simple task. In most cases the emotions 
do not appear on the surface of a judicial opinion, a legislated 
norm, or another articulation of a legal issue. Instead, the prac-
tice of dichotomizing law and emotions obscures the emotion or 
emotions that may be relevant to a particular legal context; we 
need therefore to dig beneath the surface, and ask ourselves 
how emotion might be implicated in such contexts. This process 
often permits us to see that emotions play a role that has not 
been acknowledged, or that they have been misapprehended in 
the context of existing legal doctrine.  
Sometimes reconsidering a legal problem from the perspec-
tive of the emotions will reveal that emotions have been mar-
ginalized within conventional analysis. This is both a remainder 
and a reminder of the traditional dichotomy between law and 
emotions and its consequences. Typically in such cases, the ac-
cepted rationalist understanding of the subject either ignores 
the emotions altogether, or alludes to them briefly or shallowly 
as a matter that requires no inquiry or explanation. For exam-
ple, writing about prisoners awaiting execution on death row, 
Professor Amy Smith illuminates the glaring neglect of the 
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negative emotions that occurs during the extended period of 
time between conviction and execution.140 Describing an aver-
age wait time of twelve years, she writes:  
[W]hile our Constitution claims to protect us against “cruel and un-
usual punishment,” a complex combination of circumstances and ig-
norance have somehow lulled us into believing that those we have 
condemned to death either deserve this pain in exchange for the 
harms they have caused or that they don’t suffer much as they await 
their executions.141 
Professor Smith explains that legal actors have started to 
use the term “death row syndrome,” to describe the psychologi-
cal effects of the experience of living in the harsh conditions of 
death row for a long period of time.142 However, she calls atten-
tion to the fact that despite legal “use of the word ‘syndrome,’ 
. . . the concept has never been systematically studied by psy-
chologists, psychiatrists, or social scientists.”143 Smith’s atten-
tion is directed at the lack of nonlegal research, and she does 
not link her analysis to the law and emotions project. And yet, 
this argument could be read as underscoring the law’s utter 
failure to consider the devastating affective outcomes of lives 
lived on death row. This is an important understanding which 
has potential bearings on legal regulation, as it exposes a cru-
cial dimension of the “cruel and unusual” punishment that the 
Constitution proscribes.144  
Another observable pattern from an affective perspective is 
the legal failure to differentiate the particular emotions that 
may be relevant to a particular legal question. Although there 
are contexts in which it may be useful to speak generally about 
“the emotions,”145 this monolithic characterization is often in-
dicative of a persistent tendency to dichotomize emotion and 
reason. In many cases, the monolithic conception means that 
 
 140. See Amy Smith, Not “Waiving” but Drowning: The Anatomy of Death 
Row Syndrome and Volunteering for Execution, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 237, 237 
(2008). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 238. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. at 240 (“While some scholars have argued that death row phe-
nomenon, as used in international law, has few or no implications for capital 
punishment within the United States, others have suggested that its existence 
may raise constitutional issues. Indeed, there is quite a bit of legal scholarship 
speculating on the appropriateness and likely success of claims based on 
‘death row phenomenon.’”). 
 145. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: 
Implications of Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) (discussing “fear appeals” in the abortion context).  
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“emotions” are being imagined as a bundle of overwhelming 
and uncontrollable “feelings” which, by definition, threaten the 
intellectual process of legal reasoning. This perception of the 
emotions may fuel an intentional effort to separate the emo-
tions from law; as such, it goes beyond the simple legal neglect 
of the emotions.  
For example, in California v. Brown, the Court affirmed an 
instruction stipulating that capital jurors assessing mitigation 
“must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, 
passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.”146 In ex-
plaining her support for the ruling, Justice O’Connor argued 
that “the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a 
reasoned moral response to the defendant’s background, charac-
ter, and crime rather than mere sympathy or emotion.”147 The 
undifferentiated treatment of emotion signals Justice 
O’Connor’s view of it as utterly distinct from, and destructive 
of, appropriate legal reasoning.  
A similar pattern exists in the failure of contract law to en-
force gratuitous promises.148 Akin to instructing capital jurors 
to ignore their feelings in assessing mitigation, contract law 
historically made a deliberate choice to ignore those promises 
that are assumed to be motivated by emotions rather than by 
rational calculations, such as the profit motivation. In such 
cases, the failure to disaggregate “the emotions” not only re-
flects a deep suspicion of the role of affect in law, it also pre-
vents analysts from glimpsing and analyzing the specific emo-
tions such as empathy and gratitude that are actually 
implicated in gratuitous promises.  
Occasionally, applying an affective frame reveals a legal 
decisionmaker gesturing toward particular emotions, without 
attempting fully to understand them. Chris Guthrie has made 
this argument, for example, about the Court’s opinion in Gon-
zales v. Carhart.149 He argues that when the majority invoked 
the risk of women’s regret as a ground for upholding a law pro-
scribing one form of late-term abortion, it named this emotion 
 
 146. 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The example is 
taken from Dustin Latka, From Vengeance to Mercy: Examining the Other 
and Finding the Human 3 (2007) (unpublished manuscript for 2007 seminar 
entitled “Challenges of Legal Rationality,” on file with authors). 
 147. Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (second emphasis added). 
 148. See Keren, supra note 92 (manuscript at 3). 
 149. Guthrie, supra note 80, at 877. 
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without knowing, or attempting to learn, about it.150 Thus the 
Court failed to engage an important body of research, explain-
ing how people anticipate, experience, and respond to regret, 
that would have shown this emotion to be a less serious prob-
lem than the Court predicted.151  
Clare Huntington has made a similar point about family 
law, and its assumptions about the emotions that shape famili-
al conflicts.152 Conventional family law, according to Hunting-
ton, assumes a simplistic binary affective model that dichoto-
mizes love and hate.153 For example, a couple is either married 
(love) or divorced (hate); birth parents either retain custody of 
their children (love) or relinquish their children completely to 
other adults (hate).154 But, this reductive model is at odds with 
what psychologists and other social scientists have learned 
about the affective cycles that typify intimate relationships: 
these cycles often move from love to anger to guilt to efforts at 
repair.155 By recognizing a limited affective model, which ac-
knowledges only rupture but not a possible repair, the law 
freezes familial relationships at the moment of breakdown and 
“exacerbates emotional harm within families.”156 By surfacing 
emotions that the law has tended to neglect, or demonstrating 
why legal doctrine requires a more thorough understanding of 
their operation,157 affective analysis in its “illumination” mode 
permits a new understanding of family functioning. 
Another group of cases which stand to benefit from affec-
tive analysis are those in which the law’s significant impact on 
particular emotions has not been acknowledged. This impact 
can work in two directions. On the one hand, doctrine may fail 
to acknowledge the law’s negative impact on certain emotions. 
Samuel Bagenstos and Margo Schlanger argue, for example, 
that the award of “hedonic damages” to those who become dis-
 
 150. See id. at 881. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See Huntington, supra note 64, at 1254. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. at 1260. 
 156. See id. at 1249. 
 157. See, e.g., Emery, supra note 97, at 347 (arguing that the insight that a 
single emotion, such as anger, can have different motivations and serve differ-
ent goals in different contexts has important implications for family law). 
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abled in accidents risks precisely such negative impact.158 Its 
flawed assumption that those disabled by an accident suffer 
substantial losses in “enjoyment” of life—when in fact their en-
joyment returns to earlier levels after a short period of adjust-
ment—induces nondisabled people to pity them without justifi-
cation.159 Such unwarranted pity is an affective cost obliviously 
induced by the legal remedy of hedonic damages.160  
In another example, Carol Sanger uses the law and emo-
tions lens to expose the affective cost of the “judicial bypass” 
process on pregnant teenagers seeking abortions.161 Sanger il-
luminates the humiliation that this process may cause to 
young, unmarried girls who do not enjoy parental support and 
are required to testify in court “about the circumstances of in-
tercourse, their mishaps with contraception, misgivings about 
pregnancy, or the nature of their relationships with those clos-
est to them.”162 This emotion of humiliation is different from 
and worse than a feeling of embarrassment; it is triggered by 
the fact that the confession of the pregnant girl is compelled, 
and delivered in a formal public setting, to authoritarian stran-
gers.163 Engendering humiliation, Sanger concludes, is a cost of 
the bypass process that has not been considered by lawmakers; 
it threatens severe harm to the girls involved as well as a basic 
denial of our society’s decency.164 
On the other hand, using the same lens, scholars can 
glimpse places where legal actors have neglected their potential 
to cultivate valuable and positive emotions. Solangel Maldona-
do makes this argument with respect to forgiveness in family 
law.165 Although reforms such as no-fault divorce have not de-
creased the levels of “bitterness and vengefulness that character-
ize some divorces,”166 Maldonado sees potential in a legal focus on 
 
 158. Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 82, at 778–84 (arguing that by 
awarding hedonic damages courts are encouraging pity and distracting atten-
tion from societal choices that create disability).  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, 
and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 414 (2009) (describing 
a regulatory scheme that requires pregnant teenagers who want to obtain an 
abortion without getting their parents’ consent to “convince a judge that they 
are sufficiently mature and informed to make the decision themselves”). 
 162. Id. at 447. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 497. 
 165. Maldonado, supra note 64, at 444. 
 166. See id. at 459. 
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forgiveness. 167  Drawing from forgiveness models developed by 
scholars in other disciplines, Maldonado argues that family law 
can cultivate forgiveness by offering “Healing Divorce Pro-
grams” to high-conflict divorcing couples.168  
The illumination dimension of law and emotions work is 
thus aimed at exposing law’s limited or mistaken assumptions, 
about the emotions in general or about particular emotions. 
The level of effort required by such analysis may depend on the 
particular starting point for a scholar’s inquiry, and the extent 
to which the connection of a legal issue to emotions has been 
concealed by the accretion of “rational” legal analysis. When 
the focal point is a legal problem that directly raises an affec-
tive concern, the connection may be evident and easy to illumi-
nate. For example, scholars who have debated the value of ad-
mitting victim impact statements in capital sentencing 
proceedings face a context which is explicitly emotion-laden: 
from empathy and compassion toward the victim and her loved 
ones to vengeance and hatred toward the defendant.169  
In other cases, affective connection may not be obvious 
from the context, and the scholar may need to work in a differ-
ent way. A scholar may grasp the connection between law and a 
particular emotion or multiple emotions only in retrospect, af-
ter she has developed some knowledge regarding these emo-
tions. Accordingly, some works in the field begin from an an-
alysis of a particular emotion or of emotions, and only then 
move on to connect their insights to legal contexts in which 
those emotions play a role. For example, writing about the role 
of emotions in risk regulation, Dan Kahan begins with three 
leading theories for conceptualizing this role,170 and only then 
turns to what he calls “normative and prescriptive implica-
tions.”171 In exploring such questions as whether legislatures 
 
 167. See id. at 479. 
 168. Id. at 492–95 (describing Healing Divorce Programs and their connec-
tion to forgiveness). 
 169. See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact State-
ments, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 392 (1996). As Bandes explains: “[c]apital pun-
ishment jurisprudence is also unavoidably emotional. Indeed, it is one of the 
rare areas of law in which an explicit dialogue about emotion takes place.” Id. 
at 390; see also Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at 
the Criminal Trial, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 
135, 143 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gerwitz eds., 1996); Yoshino, supra note 139, at 
1883–84. 
 170. See Kahan, supra note 85, at 744 (exploring at length philosophical, 
psychological, behavioral, and cultural meanings of each of these theories). 
 171. Id. at 760. 
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should “limit access to guns in order to avoid the risk of shoot-
ing accidents or violent crime,”172 Kahan demonstrates the way 
his view of the emotions (as expressing and protecting cultural 
norms) can contribute to a better understanding of a particular 
legal dilemma.173 Making both kinds of efforts—from doctrine 
deeper into the emotions and from emotions back to doctrine—
is crucial to realizing the full potential of affective analysis.  
In illuminating the place of emotions in a particular legal 
setting, it is important to note the wide variety of legal ques-
tions to which law and emotions tools can be applied. Not only 
have we seen examples from different areas of law (criminal 
law, constitutional law, family law, the law of contracts, crimi-
nal procedure, tort law, education law, and administrative law), 
but we have also seen that emotions may be implicated in 
judge-made doctrine, legislation, regulation, and legislative 
programs which reflect public policy. This variety suggests a 
wealth of possible targets for such scholarship, as well as the 
potential for broad contribution by its practitioners.  
B. INVESTIGATION 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the law’s deep com-
mitment to rationalism can render legal actors oblivious or ill-
informed about the emotions that infuse it. Exploring and high-
lighting the research into emotion that is emerging from other 
disciplinary fields is thus a critical step toward improving legal 
understanding. This is especially true in legal settings that are 
affectively laden, such as reproductive choice, victim impact 
statements, or in contexts in which the law embraces specifical-
ly affective goals, such as enhancing deterrence by cultivating 
shame among criminal offenders.174 Under these circumstances, 
the lack of awareness and understanding among legal decision-
makers can be a critical shortcoming. What we define here as 
the “investigation” dimension of law and emotions scholarship 
refers to the efforts to fill this void.  
Informing and enriching legal understanding of particular 
emotions or affective phenomena lies at the heart of law and 
emotions work. In this section, we explore the ways in which 
such efforts can be pursued. Our argument is twofold: first, we 
 
 172. Id. at 763. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions, in THE PASSIONS 
OF LAW, supra note 43, at 80 (discussing the relationship between law, emo-
tions, and the literature on social norms). 
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argue that an investigation effort is essential for the law and 
emotions project; second, however, we observe that simply en-
gaging in such vital work is not sufficient to reveal the full po-
tential of law and emotions scholarship.175 In the work with 
greatest pragmatic potential, thorough interdisciplinary inves-
tigation of the emotions is the crucial predicate for normative 
thinking about the law: either about its amelioration or about 
its role in shaping the affective lives of its subjects. 
The investigation effort is essential because what often jus-
tifies affective analysis, in the eyes of those outside of the law 
and emotions field, is the lack of knowledge among mainstream 
legal scholars about emotions which may be playing a crucial 
role in particular legal contexts. Although it may sound obvious 
that when knowledge regarding the emotions is lacking, an in-
vestigation should follow, not all law and emotions works have 
focused adequate attention on the investigation phase.  
As we have seen, the first generation of law and emotions 
work was mainly devoted to the task of undermining the di-
chotomy between law and emotions and seemed to end after ac-
complishing this important goal. 176  To the extent that such 
works explored emotions independently, they did so for the lim-
ited purpose of targeting the myth that emotions threaten ra-
tionality and distort legal reasoning. For example, some legal 
scholars explored research from other fields which increasingly 
suggested that “emotions are partly cognitive in their very 
structure.”177 This interdisciplinary insight helped to streng-
then the conventional legal view that “emotions are not merely 
instinctive and uncontrollable.”178  
However, a focus that sidestepped systematic investigation 
of the emotions persisted in some law and emotions work, even 
as it moved beyond challenging the reason/emotion dichotomy, 
to addressing substantive areas of law. Recall, for example, 
 
 175. Cf. Posner, supra note 28 (reflecting on scholarship in which investi-
gation was taken to be sufficient, with only passing attention given to the in-
tegration task that we see as crucial). 
 176. See, e.g., Harris & Shultz, supra note 14, at 1773 (writing about legal 
pedagogy and focusing on the damage that can be produced by the ways 
“[c]lassical legal education celebrates reason and devalues emotion” by failing 
to draw upon research pertaining to the emotions that may be relevant to 
their discussion).  
 177. Id. at 1786; see also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Con-
ceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 277–78 (1996) 
(making a similar general point about the cognitive component of the emo-
tions). 
 178. Bandes, supra note 44, at 14. 
  
2042 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [94:1997 
 
Amy Smith’s argument that the law has neglected the affective 
damage caused by years of waiting for execution on death 
row.179 Professor Smith calls on psychologists and psychiatrists 
to study the phenomenon, but she declines to engage in a simi-
lar effort herself. While this choice may reflect the challenges of 
undertaking original, interdisciplinary, empirical work, there 
are many resources on which a legal scholar might have drawn 
to lay a foundation for such an effort.180 Law and emotions 
scholars can enhance the potential contribution of their illumi-
nation efforts by investigating existing literatures that explore 
attributes of those emotions implicated in their particular con-
texts. This work may provide a useful foundation for legal scho-
lars unfamiliar with these emotions, and for those who might 
be encouraged, as Smith proposes, to undertake research into 
their operation.181  
Similarly, Bagenstos and Schlanger, in their work on he-
donic damages, offered an instructive investigation of one emo-
tion implicated by their question (joy),182 yet did not undertake 
a similar inquiry into another emotion that was central to their 
thesis (pity). Their argument that awarding hedonic damages 
inappropriately cultivates pity toward the injured person seems 
to call for an investigation of the nature and operation of pity. 
Moreover, this inquiry should be contextualized and shaped by 
the reasons that readers want to know more about pity.183 As 
the authors argue that we induce pity by awarding a legal rem-
edy, it seems important to explore whether and how this par-
ticular emotion can be externally cultivated or induced.  
Works such as these that focus primarily on “illumination” 
provide a crucial function by alerting mainstream scholars and 
actors to the affective issues implicated by doctrine. But specif-
ically because these audiences may have had so little exposure 
to analysis of the emotions, it can enhance the value of such 
works to take whatever steps are possible toward informing le-
 
 179. See Smith, supra note 140, at 252–53. 
 180. In Professor Smith’s case, for example, legal and philosophical work 
about hope, hopelessness, and despair, in the death penalty context and else-
where, might have provided a useful foundation.  
 181. See Smith, supra note 140, at 252–53. 
 182. See Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 82, at 781–88. 
 183. See Bandes, supra note 44, at 3 (explaining “the need to treat each 
emotion contextually”). For a fine example of such contextual analysis see 
Martha Minow’s discussion of vengeance in Martha Minow, Institutions and 
Emotions: Redressing Mass Violence, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 43, 
at 265–84. 
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gal audiences about the emotions in question, and highlighting 
the questions about those emotions that are particularly ger-
mane to the legal context.  
While a thorough exploration of emotions is highly impor-
tant for the formulation of a usable law and emotions scholar-
ship, it may not, in and of itself, be sufficient to that task. A 
prime example can be found in William Miller’s groundbreak-
ing work, The Anatomy of Disgust.184 This work set what many 
scholars viewed as the gold standard for nuanced interdiscipli-
nary investigation of specific emotions; yet it placed little or no 
emphasis on linking this investigation to actual legal problems 
and their resolution. It was only as scholars such as Dan Ka-
han began to ask what instruction could be drawn from Miller’s 
trove of insights for the direction of the criminal law that it be-
came clearer how an investigation of disgust could serve the 
pragmatic goals of legal actors.185 
In the remainder of this section, we will identify the kinds 
of efforts that typify the investigation dimension. This exposi-
tion may encourage legal scholars to resist the traditional insu-
larity of the law, and undertake the inquiry into particular 
emotions that is necessary to advance their arguments.  
As legal actors are deeply invested in the “rational” image 
of the law, they are particularly averse to emotion when they 
view it as an “impulse[] or surge[]” of affect, which is “more or 
less devoid of thought or perception.”186 To overcome this resis-
tance to affective analysis, it is important to prepare the 
ground by highlighting the connections between emotions and 
cognition. In Descartes’ Error, for example, Antonio Damasio 
points to the imprecise and misleading character of the rea-
 
 184. MILLER, supra note 55. 
 185. See Kahan, supra note 60, at 1631. Kahan explains: 
My aim, however, is not to determine whether Miller gets it right 
about disgust. Rather, it is to see whether Miller’s account supplies a 
useful remedy for the inattention to disgust in criminal law theory. 
And for that purpose, it is neither necessary nor sufficient that his ac-
count be true in some abstract philosophical sense. The law has its 
own distinctive purposes and needs. If it doesn’t suit these, even an 
admittedly true account of disgust would be irrelevant or possibly 
even pernicious. By the same token, the law might be justified in ac-
cepting the guidance of an admittedly false account if it could none-
theless be shown to be useful. 
(first, third, and fourth emphases added); see also Maldonado, supra note 64, 
at 479–85 (applying Murphy and Hampton’s research on forgiveness to the le-
gal context of divorce (citing JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVE-
NESS AND MERCY (1988))).  
 186. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 177, at 277–78.  
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son/emotion dichotomy.187 To him, emotions are forms of intel-
ligent awareness: “just as cognitive as other precepts.”188 Once 
the sharp distinction is removed, two arguments unfold. On the 
one hand, as works by scholars such as Martha Nussbaum 
demonstrate, many emotions have a cognitive structure: they 
embody judgments about the objects to which they respond that 
has a kind of logical structure.189 Nussbaum argues, for exam-
ple, that disgust is not only an “especially visceral emotion” but 
also an emotion that “has a complex cognitive content”: a desire 
to distance oneself from an object or practice that reveals one’s 
animality and inevitable mortality.190  
On the other hand, as psychologists such as Jonathan 
Haidt have argued,191 the process of cognitive decisionmaking 
embodies vital affective components. In one experiment, for ex-
ample, people who received a gift while shopping in a mall be-
came happier, and without being aware of it, evaluated their 
cars as performing better than those of control subjects who 
had received no gift.192 This appreciation of the emotional di-
mensions of cognition is particularly useful for a wide range of 
emotions that may be relevant to legal problems and it can help 
in preparing the ground for further investigation of the emo-
tions: if various emotions have the structure of cognition, and 
cognition itself often functions in an intuitive, affective way, 
then bringing the two together by recognizing the place of emo-
tions in law does not seem anomalous after all.  
Another part of the preparation phase involves identifying 
the specific emotions that are implicated in a particular legal 
context. As Susan Bandes has reminded us, the emotions that 
 
 187. ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR xv (1994). 
 188. Id.  
 189. See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 25, at 40; ANDREW ORTNOY, THE 
COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS 1 (1988); Richard Lazarus, Universal 
Antecedents of the Emotions, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION 163 (Paul Ekman & 
Richard J. Davidson eds., 1994) (arguing that emotions consist of “motivation-
al, cognitive and coping activities that orient . . . creatures selectively to rele-
vant features of their environments”).  
 190. See Nussbaum, supra note 58, at 22–25. 
 191. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social In-
tuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 815 (2001) (ex-
plaining how cognition works on two tracks, one that functions instantaneously 
and intuitively, and another that proceeds through conscious, temporally sus-
tained, logical operations). 
 192. See OATLEY ET AL., supra note 10, at 24 (describing research underta-
ken by Alice Isen and her colleagues).  
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pervade law are often “invisible”193 and therefore an indepen-
dent effort is often necessary to expose the emotions that are 
relevant to the discussion. 
Huntington’s Repairing Family Law offers a fine exam-
ple.194 Drawing on a theory of intimacy first articulated by psy-
choanalytic theorist Melanie Klein, Huntington suggests that 
certain emotions and affective dynamics stand at the core of 
conflicts that emerge in the intimate sphere.195 While family 
law has only noticed the binary existence of love and hate in 
those conflicts,196 her interdisciplinary research shows “the cyc-
lical nature of familial relationships.”197 In this cycle, guilt feel-
ings and a following emotive drive for reparation play a major 
role—a role which Huntington importantly exposes and identi-
fies before delving into her investigation of the cycle of intimacy 
in Western culture and its acceptance in modern psychological 
thought and numerous other academic disciplines.198  
Similarly, in Considering Affective Consideration, the resis-
tance of contracts scholars to the enforcement of promises to 
give gifts was animated by a particular view of either “the emo-
tions” (as one thing) or a random list of emotions that were in-
tuitively perceived to be connected to intimate relationships.199 
While tracing the inferior legal status of gifts to their affective 
associations belongs with the illumination dimension, the 
choice to focus on the exploration of the concrete emotions of 
empathy and gratitude (and their relation to each other) is part 
of the investigation dimension. This choice results from asking 
which emotions are linked with the altruistic act of gift promis-
ing—a question that can be answered only by drawing on in-
terdisciplinary expertise.200  
 
 193. Bandes, supra note 44, at 2. 
 194. Huntington, supra note 64, at 1254–66. 
 195. Id. at 1245–46 (identifying the role of love, hate, and guilt in intimate 
relationships within the context of family law). 
 196. We classify this argument as belonging to the illumination dimension.  
 197. Huntington, supra note 64, at 1247. 
 198. Id. at 1260–74 (investigating the dynamic cycle of emotions in the in-
timate setting as it is described by different scholars in various disciplines). 
 199. Keren, supra note 92 (manuscript at 3–9); see also Eisenberg, supra 
note 111, at 849. According to Keren: 
The world of gift is a world of our better selves in which affective val-
ues like love, friendship, affection, gratitude, and comradeship are the 
prime motivating forces. These values are too important to be en-
forced by law and would be undermined if the enforcement of simple, 
affective donative promises were to be mandated by the law. 
 200. Batson’s empathy-altruism hypothesis is a frequently cited explana-
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The effort to identify the specific emotion(s) at play in a 
particular legal context is itself informed by research from out-
side the law. Mainstream legal scholars who understand emo-
tions primarily in distinction to reason often think about emo-
tions as undifferentiated. Those who study emotions in other 
fields, however, observe that emotions cannot be discussed mo-
nolithically. In the seminal book The Emotional Brain, for ex-
ample, neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux compellingly makes this 
point: 
[W]e saw that attempts to find a single unified brain system of emo-
tion have not been very successful. It is possible that such a system 
exists and that scientists just haven’t been clever enough to find it, 
but I don’t think that’s the case. False. . . . Different emotions are 
mediated by different brain networks, different modules . . . . 
If I’m correct, the only way to understand how emotions come out of 
brains is to study emotions one at a time.201 
In working to identify the specific emotions that inform 
particular legal contexts, law and emotions scholars face the 
challenge of going beyond the limited list of emotions that have 
been conventionally associated with law. Such familiar emo-
tions as anger, compassion, mercy, vengeance, and hatred202 
remain relevant; yet law and emotions scholars should be alert 
to the operation of other emotions. Indeed, examples from the 
existing law and emotions literature include happiness, guilt, 
forgiveness, romantic love, gratitude, loyalty, envy, regret, and 
our own engagement with hope.203 The list, we argue, is almost 
infinite and should remain open to accommodate new research 
and reflection from a variety of fields.204  
 
tion for the direct causational connection between emotion and the readiness 
to help others. See C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION (1991) (re-
viewing the altruism literature and suggesting the empathy-altruism hypo-
thesis). 
 201. JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDER-
PINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 105–06 (1996) (emphasis added). 
 202. Bandes, supra note 44, at 2. 
 203. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 64, at 1254–66 (exploring love, hate, 
and guilt); Calhoun, supra note 61, at 217–40 (exploring romantic love); Ab-
rams & Keren, supra note 63, at 361–71 (exploring the role of law in cultivat-
ing hope). 
 204. This phase of analysis may also involve analyzing alleged affective 
phenomena which may not, on careful examination, turn out to be emotions, 
and may not function the way that advocates or analysts have suggested that 
they do. An interesting example in this regard is Susan Bandes’s work on “clo-
sure” in the context of the death penalty. See Bandes, supra note 120. The goal 
of seeking “closure” for families of victims of murder or mass violence has be-
come an important factor in shaping the penalty phase of capital trials for 
those defendants charged with the crimes. Id. at 1–4. Bandes draws extensive-
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As the investigation passes these preparatory steps and 
moves into a full exploration and synthesis of the existing liter-
ature, its distinguishing characteristic is its grave complexi-
ty.205 Knowledge about the emotions has been augmented in 
varied disciplines and within numerous bodies of research. A 
law and emotions scholar may find it complex to locate all the 
knowledge that is already available outside of the legal sphere 
with regard to the particular emotion she is interested in inves-
tigating.206 There may, moreover, be no crystallization of an 
agreed view with regard to the most basic questions, not even 
concerning the meaning of the term “emotion” itself. Further-
more, identifying the emotions that operate in a particular set-
ting may be complicated by the fact that the relevant affective 
state is described in different words by different authors, or in 
different fields. The other-directed feeling which leads to al-
truistic motivation (and to the making of gratuitous promises), 
for example, has been described by various terms, including 
“sympathy,” “empathy,” “pity,” and “compassion.”207  
Perhaps most critically, legal scholars who seek to unite 
law with research into the emotions must process and distill in-
sights that have developed for decades in other fields such as 
psychology, neurobiology, anthropology, and philosophy. They 
must make judgments about which fields or literatures are 
most germane to a particular legal context, and develop syn-
thetic accounts of the emotion(s) in question which both reflect 
the insights of the contributing fields and shed light on the le-
gal question. Susan Bandes’s analysis of the pseudo-emotion of 
 
ly on psychological and sociological literature to demonstrate that “closure” is 
not in fact an emotion, id. at 25–26, and the kinds of feelings toward which 
advocates of “closure” (i.e., victims’ rights organizations) aim are not predicta-
bly facilitated by expedients—such as victim impact statements or the wit-
nessing by victims’ families of defendants’ executions—that have been en-
dorsed as means of bringing them about. Id. at 16–26. 
 205. On the dilemma facing legal scholars who must address complex mul-
tidisciplinary research into the emotions, see Massaro, supra note 174, at 83–
89. 
 206. JEROME KAGAN, WHAT IS EMOTION? xi (2007) (explaining about his 
book-writing process that “[b]ecause emotions are an active domain of inquiry, 
the completion of each chapter resembled the removal of fallen leaves from a 
vast lawn on a windy day in October”). As the emotions have become active 
domains of inquiry in many fields, legal scholars who do ongoing work in this 
area must stay abreast of a rapidly changing base of knowledge. See Bandes, 
supra note 44, at 7. 
 207. RICHARD S. LAZARUS, EMOTION AND ADAPTATION 287–88 (1991) (ob-
serving the overlap and the need to clarify the confusion among sympathy, 
empathy, pity, and compassion).  
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“closure,” for example, encompasses psychological work both on 
the elusive character of that alleged response, and on the prox-
imate emotions of grief and loss.208 Moreover, her analysis of 
the effects of victim impact statements on survivors draws on 
sociological literature on the social and institutional shaping of 
emotion,209 to argue that the effects of expressing grief in the 
private familial, or even therapeutic, context—which often 
grounds the use of victim impact statements in the penalty 
phase of capital trials—are likely to differ starkly from the ef-
fects of expressing grief in the impersonal, highly structured 
and scripted setting of the courtroom.210  
While sorting out the information, the challenge is to avoid 
oversimplification, on the one hand, and still to create a useful 
synthesis of knowledge which will improve the understanding 
of law and its impact, on the other. A “useful synthesis” will 
sort and arrange the nonlegal knowledge in a manner which 
responds to the context and legal questions at hand. This 
means that some important theories or data will be purposeful-
ly omitted, while other facts and theories may be emphasized 
beyond their relative weight outside of law. For example, in 
responding to Carhart’s concern for women’s regret, Professor 
Guthrie argued that the court had misapprehended the ways 
that the emotion of regret operates.211 Yet his synthetic analy-
sis of the “psychology of regret” was necessarily selective. Tail-
oring the nonlegal psychological insights to the Court’s as-
sumptions led Guthrie not only to highlight insights such as 
the human tendency to avoid and to learn from regret,212 but 
also to eliminate parts of the psychological literature that have 
less connection to the abortion dilemma.213  
With the wide range of emotion theories, the many discip-
lines that study emotions, the abundant literature they pro-
duce, and the rapid pace of scientific progress, the complexity of 
 
 208. Bandes, supra note 120, at 18–25.  
 209. Id. at 4–8. 
 210. Id. at 16–25. 
 211. Guthrie, supra note 80, at 882–902. 
 212. See id. at 898–902 (documenting regret aversion and regret learning).  
 213. For example, some studies demonstrate that young children cannot 
experience regret, because they have difficulties retrieving the past and relat-
ing it to the present. Most likely because this otherwise important information 
regarding regret was remote from the context of adult decisions about abor-
tion, Guthrie did not include it in his law and emotions analysis. Compare id., 
with KAGAN, supra note 206, at 30 (documenting children’s difficulty in expe-
riencing regret). 
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the investigation work may be daunting. Perhaps for this rea-
son, scholarly collaborations between legal scholars and those 
who study emotions in other disciplines are gradually becoming 
more common.214 Through whatever vehicle, however, coping 
with the challenge is not only extremely enriching, it is also 
crucial to creating a law and emotions scholarship with solid 
grounding in emotions research that enables it to be useful. 
Generally speaking, the key to breaking the traditional aliena-
tion between law and emotions is to be found in deepening the 
familiarity of legal actors with the emotions: with various affec-
tive dynamics, with the importance of the emotions to any “ra-
tional” decisionmaking, and with concrete emotions that are 
tightly connected to law and/or highly influenced by it.  
C. INTEGRATION  
The third dimension of law and emotions scholarship is 
“integration.” Scholars apply the analyses of particular emo-
tions that they have gleaned from work in other disciplines to 
address particular problems in legal doctrine, policy, or argu-
mentation.215 For scholars whose work encompasses all three 
dimensions, this means returning to the problem that they in-
itially identified as implicating the emotions, and developing 
normative proposals. For scholars who begin with an analysis 
of particular emotions, this third dimension means thinking 
about how their investigation may help to address specific legal 
issues. Attention to this dimension has emerged more recently 
in law and emotions scholarship; scholars outside the field may 
be less cognizant of this dimension than of the first two. Where 
it has been glimpsed, moreover, this dimension has proved 
more controversial than the first two. The development of nor-
mative legal proposals—particularly those which use law to 
foster, direct, or discourage specific emotions—may arouse both 
epistemological and practical concerns in some legal scholars 
and readers. 
In the following discussion, we examine two attributes of 
“integration.” First, we consider the normative goals of this 
 
 214. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 84; Dan M. Kahan & Donald 
Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Per-
ceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (2003); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 177; 
Jolls et al., supra note 84. 
 215. See David J. Arkush, Situating Emotion: A Critical Realist View of 
Emotion and Nonconscious Cognitive Processes for Law and Legal Theory, 
2008 BYU L. REV. 1275, 1365. 
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scholarship: that is, what law and emotions scholars aim to 
achieve by using affective analysis to inform legal intervention. 
Then we explore the normative means of this scholarship: what 
legal instrumentalities it uses in these interventions. Our an-
alysis will address some of the normative concerns that have 
been provoked by more ambitious forms of this scholarship. But 
we aim primarily to demonstrate that the normative dimension 
of this body of work—as well as its “illumination” and “investi-
gation”—has practical promise. 
1. Normative Goals 
When law and emotions scholars use affective analysis to 
structure legal proposals, they have one (or more) of several 
possible goals. Many are simply trying to improve legal doc-
trine or policy, by making it more responsive to emotions that 
inflect its operation. If women’s reproductive decisionmaking, 
as Jeremy Blumenthal argues, can be distorted both by mis-
leading facts and by extremes of emotion, then the standard for 
state abortion regulations should encompass both.216 But law 
and emotions scholars do not simply see affective analysis as a 
vehicle for improving legal decisionmaking. Many also view le-
gal doctrine, policy, and various forms of legal rhetoric, as ve-
hicles for influencing the emotions. These goals may, moreover, 
be pursued in tandem: Hila Keren’s recent work, for example, 
aims not only to improve the law of contract through (an affec-
tive argument for) enforcing gratuitous promises; it also seeks 
to foster the empathy and gratitude reflected in such promises, 
by making them legally enforceable.217  
This section examines the less familiar, and potentially 
more controversial, of these goals: the idea that we can and 
should use law to produce particular effects on the emotions. It 
begins with an analytic question: in what ways can law engage 
the emotions?  
a. A Framework for Analyzing Law’s Relations to the Emotions 
As we have studied the work that has been done in investi-
gating particular emotions or highlighting their role within 
specific legal contexts or questions, we have identified a num-
 
 216. See Blumenthal, supra note 4, at 36–38 (discussing the crucial role of 
the emotions in the context of spousal notification laws). 
 217. Keren, supra note 92 (manuscript at 80–81). 
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ber of possible relations between law and various emotions.218 
These relations run the gamut from the purposive—action un-
dertaken specifically because of its emotional effects—to the 
largely inadvertent. In some cases, legal actors understand or 
anticipate the emotional effects of their choices, though these 
effects are not the primary object of their action. Comprehend-
ing the range of such relations is an important first step to un-
derstanding the goals to which they might be turned: revising 
law to respond to new understandings of the emotions, or using 
law to produce specific emotional effects. We describe these re-
lations below, in an order that reflects an increasing degree of 
intervention by law in the emotions in question. 
Law may, first, serve as a vehicle for expressing society’s 
collective response. In this role, law serves to mirror, project, or 
in some cases, support or amplify,219 an emotion that is already 
present. This relation has become familiar in the context of 
criminal law: when the law criminalizes and punishes specific 
acts, for example, it becomes one vehicle through which citizens 
can express their anger, indignation, or disgust at these 
crimes.220  
 
 218. In a fascinating forthcoming article, Clare Huntington undertakes an 
inquiry that has some intersection with the one we pursue here. Huntington, 
supra note 81. Huntington is interested in the relation between emotions, so-
cial norms, and the law, and in particular she is interested in the way that the 
state, when it undertakes “norm entrepreneurship”—the process of fostering 
or redirecting social norms—acts through the emotions. Several of the rela-
tions between law and emotions that we describe below occur in the context of 
norm generation, or have the effect of fostering or shifting social norms: par-
ticularly the relations of expression and scripting. Also, we suspect that some 
of the inadvertent legal effects on emotions may occur in contexts where the 
primary goal is some form of norm generation. However, while we find Hun-
tington’s project to be highly valuable and illuminating, our focus is differ-
ent—one could say both narrower and broader—in that we are interested in 
the variety of ways in which law engages the emotions: this means that we 
will examine contexts in which norm generation is not at issue or is more inci-
dental (say, in the management or destruction of emotion, and in some con-
texts of redirection or cultivation), and that in contexts in which norm genera-
tion may also be occurring, our focus will be trained more specifically on 
emotional effects. 
 219. This appears to be the point in Dan Kahan’s argument that criminal 
law should express societal disgust at certain acts or actors. See Kahan, supra 
note 53, at 63, 69–73. The law’s expression of disgust toward perpetrators of 
hate crimes is designed not only to articulate what Kahan views as a morally 
sound response, but to encourage a response of disgust for the perpetrators of 
hate crimes (and correspondingly a diminution of such crimes) in the popula-
tion subject to this type of articulated prohibition. Id. 
 220. Some legal expression of emotion may be inadvertent, or may proceed 
differently than anticipated. See Bandes, supra note 169, at 395–98 (arguing 
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Law may also seek to modify an emotion that is already 
present among some group of legal subjects. Legal actors may, 
for example, seek to contain emotions. A legal rule might aim to 
secure decisionmaking processes from the influence of what ac-
tors believe to be highly visceral or potentially distortive emo-
tions. Jeremy Blumenthal’s effort to encompass affectively 
based distortions in reproductive decisionmaking under Casey 
is an example of this kind of containment.221 He is concerned 
that certain “informed consent” warnings about the attributes 
of the fetus may generate such strong emotions of anxiety, fear, 
or guilt as to make coherent decisionmaking impossible.222 For 
this reason he wants to consider the possibility that such warn-
ings may come within Casey’s ban on “misleading” informa-
tion.223 Similarly, Susan Bandes has argued against the use of 
victim impact statements: they induce intense empathy, which 
can prevent juries from reaching just conclusions in capital 
cases.224  
The goal of using law to contain emotions is shared by a 
small body of behavioral law and economics works that do go 
beyond the descriptive enterprise and seek to offer normative 
proposals.225 Such works critique the assumptions of rationality 
through which law and economics scholars have constructed 
homo economicus, arguing that “real people” are limited by 
their own biases and heuristics, and are characterized general-
ly by bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded 
self-interest.226 They propose legal interventions to contain the 
 
that victim impact statements, aimed at allowing victims to express grief or 
loss following from the violent death of a loved one, actually enable victims to 
express vengeance or disgust toward the perpetrators). But, in the main, the 
legal expression of emotion has an intentional character: the law is purpose-
fully deployed as a vehicle for articulating a particular affective response. 
 221. Blumenthal, supra note 145, at 27–38. 
 222. Id. at 20–26. 
 223. Id. at 36–38. 
 224. Bandes, supra note 169, at 392–93. 
 225. While behavioral law and economics scholars always offer descriptive 
work, they disagree with regard to the engagement in normative analysis. For 
an account of the debate see infra notes 304–06 and accompanying text. 
 226. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 10, at 14 (ar-
guing that describing the differences between homo economicus and “real 
people” is the main task of behavioral law and economics, and adding that the 
differences can be described “by stressing three important ‘bounds’ on human 
behavior, bounds that draw into question the central ideas of utility maximi-
zation, stable preferences, rational expectations, and optimal processing of in-
formation”).  
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influence of the biases or heuristics, from a belief that, similar-
ly to emotions, they may impede sound decisionmaking.227 Cass 
Sunstein’s view that risk assessment may be distorted by prob-
ability neglect or availability bias, for example, leads him to ar-
gue that such irrationality can be controlled by delegating such 
decisions to experts, whose training makes them less vulnera-
ble to flawed heuristics.228  
However, because of the distinct focus and assumptions of 
each body of work, such areas of normative overlap between 
law and emotions and behavioral law and economics are rela-
tively rare. Because behavioral law and economics privileges 
rationality and understands emotions and biases, in general, as 
disruptive, interventions in the emotions that aim at goals oth-
er than containment or control are largely beyond its ambit.  
Law and emotions work may also use law to manage emo-
tions. The goal of this management, which is most often applied 
to specific emotions, rather than to affective response as a gen-
eral category, is to adjust specific emotions upward or down-
ward in response to challenges in the specific context. We have 
recently begun a project that explores the role of hope in the le-
gal representation of clients on death row. Our initial research 
suggests that attorneys representing those on death row play a 
pivotal, ongoing role in managing the hopes of their clients: 
they help clients with potentially weak cases to adjust their 
hopes downward when facing a promising plea agreement, or 
help clients to adjust their hopes upward when they are sen-
tenced to death row or even life without parole, and need to 
glimpse the possibility of living a life with some value in pris-
on.229 These interventions aim at specific legal outcomes: they 
seek to prevent “volunteering,” which ends lives and creates 
ethical conflicts for death row lawyers,230 or to keep cases from 
going to trial, in contexts where a plea is more likely to avert a 
 
 227. Id. at 32–46. 
 228. SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 64–88. Interestingly, Sunstein analyzes 
fear by reference to such heuristics, focusing not, as humanistic legal scholars 
such as William Miller have done, on the judgment of danger implicit in fear, 
or on the physical sensation it produces, or on leading examples of fear in his-
torical or literary works, but rather on the heuristically flawed estimation of 
risks which can underlie fearful response. For an overview of Miller’s work, 
see William Ian Miller, Fear, Weak Legs, and Running Away: A Soldier’s Sto-
ry, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 43, at 241, 241–64. 
 229. Audio tape: Interviews from Monterey Death Penalty Conference (Feb. 
2007) (on file with authors). 
 230. C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the 
Ethics of Death Row Volunteering, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 849, 850–54 (2000). 
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death sentence.231 But they also seek to stabilize and ameli-
orate the emotional well-being of those who have been sen-
tenced to death.232  
The law can also work to channel or moderate emotions 
that are already being experienced by a particular person or 
group. Here we refer not simply to controlling the intensity of 
particular emotions, but to reshaping or redirecting them. The 
criminal law is sometimes conceptualized, in general terms, as 
a vehicle for channeling the anger, grief, or retributive urges of 
victims. The late Robert Solomon argued, somewhat more subt-
ly, that embodying the desire for retribution in the criminal law 
actually serves to moderate this emotion: it makes the desire 
for vengeance cooler and less volatile, and less socially disrup-
tive because the criminal law connects this urge to specific legal 
processes for determining guilt or punishment.233 Martha Mi-
now has made a similar point about international tribunals 
convened in response to episodes of genocide: they may turn 
consuming grief and rage toward the more concrete and socially 
attainable goal of securing justice in relation to specific perpe-
trators.234  Such channeling or moderation usually has some 
purposive dimension, although it need not be the exclusive or 
primary goal of legal action: punishment or hearings before in-
ternational tribunals may moderate the desire for vengeance, 
even as they serve the goal of justice, by bringing the culpable 
to account.  
Law may also produce more palpable transformations in 
the affective states of its subjects. One of the subtler and more 
pervasive examples of this relation is law’s capacity to script 
emotions: in other words, to prescribe the emotions that should 
be felt in particular contexts, or the particular persons or 
groups who are entitled to feel them. Scripting may be under-
stood as a more intensive form of legal intervention than man-
agement or channeling, because it may encourage subjects to 
experience emotions in contexts where they might not other-
wise have felt them (or discourage them in contexts where they 
might otherwise have arisen). Scripting, as Cheshire Calhoun 
 
 231. See Charles N.W. Keckler, Life v. Death: Who Should Capital Pun-
ishment Marginally Deter?, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 51, 95 (2006). 
 232. Cf. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Undiscovered Country: Execution Com-
petency and Contemplating Death, 98 KY. L.J. 263, 263 (2009–2010) (noting 
that a large number of death row inmates have mental difficulties that may be 
aggravated by the contemplation of an impending death). 
 233. See Solomon, supra note 61, at 131–37. 
 234. See MINOW, supra note 62, at 52–90. 
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observes, may affect subjects not only as individuals, or in the 
aggregate, but as members of identified groups.235 She argues, 
for example, that romantic love is scripted in ways that place 
heterosexuals, but not homosexuals, in the “leading roles.”236 
Heterosexual rituals and patterns of coupling—from “making 
love” to “starting a family”—shape the content of this emotion, 
as it is reproduced in language and cultural products such as 
fiction and film: only heterosexual couples are assumed—and 
encouraged—to feel romantic love. 237  By implication, legal 
scripting also creates “outlaw” emotions: emotions that are out-
side the prevailing script and, as a result, are not considered 
natural, normal, or legitimate when they emerge in distinct 
groups or contexts. Laws which proscribe gay or lesbian part-
nership or marriage thus transform same-sex couples who ex-
perience romantic love into “emotional outlaws.”238 
Similarly, informed consent laws that tell women that re-
gret, guilt, or suicidal ideation may follow from an abortion—or 
a doctrine that tells women that “[r]espect for human life finds 
an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for 
her child”239—may suggest to women that these are the proper 
emotions to feel in relation to abortion (versus reproduction). 
They may transform into “emotional outlaws” those women 
who feel ambivalence or even relief about the decision to abort, 
whose primary response to the news of a pregnancy is not a 
“bond of love,” or who may not experience the embryo or fetus 
as “[their] child.”240  
 
 235. See Calhoun, supra note 61, at 217–20. 
 236. Id. at 220–22. 
 237. Such scripting is not exclusively a legal endeavor: romantic love is 
scripted both by cultural vehicles—such as films, books, and advertisements—
and by laws that limit marriage to heterosexual couples. See id. at 217–22.  
 238. Id. at 223–25. An interesting question in this respect may be whether 
legalizing gay marriages may enable gays and lesbians to satisfy the originally 
heterosexual script. If so, it may offer an affective basis for efforts to bring 
about legal reform. See id. at 236 (arguing that allowing same-sex marriage 
may impose a threat on “the institution” of marriage). However, this change 
would still produce a category of emotional outlaws: those gays and lesbians 
(and perhaps those heterosexuals) who do not follow culturally prescribed pat-
terns for romantic love—i.e., serial monogamists, the polyamorous, and others 
who do not want to live in long-term, committed, monogamous couplings. See 
Tucker Culbertson & Jack Jackson, Proper Objects, Different Subjects and Ju-
ridical Horizons in Radical Legal Critique, in FEMINIST AND QUEER THEORY: 
INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 135–40 (Martha 
Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 2009). 
 239. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).  
 240. Id. Legal scripting can run the gamut from completely intended to 
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Legal intervention can also engender emotion in specific 
contexts through manipulation or misdirection. Here law en-
courages people to feel a particular emotion, usually positive; 
yet it does so without adequate basis, so that such feelings are 
not situationally supported or justified. Where legal actors or 
institutions understand from the outset that the positive emo-
tions their operations engender are not contextually justified, 
we might call the legal action “manipulation”; where the reali-
zation dawns only over time—making the disappointment of 
the law’s subjects inadvertent—we might call the relation 
“misdirection.” Peter Drahos illustrates purposive misdirection 
in the international approval of a regime of intellectual proper-
ty protections aimed at benefitting large pharmaceutical com-
panies. Wealthier countries manipulated the hopes of poor 
countries in securing their acquiescence, by arguing the only 
prospect of curing now-fatal diseases lay in the spur to scientif-
ic discovery provided by such protections.241  
 
largely incidental. The example of scripting Calhoun offers is implicitly ac-
knowledged or understood by those legal actors taking part in it, even where it 
may not be the primary or explicit goal of legal action. See Calhoun, supra 
note 61, at 234–36. Most people would acknowledge that pro-life advocates 
who focus on women’s guilt or regret aim to induce a particular affective re-
sponse in a woman contemplating abortion, though opinion might be more di-
vided among members of the Carhart Court. See Guthrie, supra note 80, at 
877–82. 
However, scripting can also be nonpurposive or incidental. One recent 
controversy about nonpurposive scripting concerns the legal doctrine of sexual 
harassment. There has been a longstanding debate about whether dominance 
feminism, and the sexual harassment doctrine it has helped to create, gener-
ate scripts for women that cast them as diffident, emotionally vulnerable—and 
thereby marginal—denizens of the workplace. Compare KATIE ROIPHE, THE 
MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS 85–113 (1993) (sug-
gesting that political correctness on campus has resulted in the label “sexual 
harassment” becoming overinclusive), with Kathryn Abrams, Songs of Inno-
cence and Experience: Dominance Feminism in the University, 103 YALE L.J. 
1533, 1534 (1994) (reviewing ROIPHE, supra) (suggesting that Roiphe’s subtext 
is “that sexualized oppression is mainly a problem inside women’s heads”). It 
seems unlikely that this was a goal of those who formulated the doctrine. More 
recently, some feminists and queer theorists have argued that sexual harass-
ment doctrine has scripted not only the subordination of sexuality, but all 
forms of sexual desire out of the workplace, casting those who exercise sexual 
desire at work in any way—be it subordinating or mutually enjoyable—as 
emotional outlaws. See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 
2061, 2063–72 (2003); see also Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT 
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 80, 80–104 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 
2002). Halley’s argument draws on poststructural social theories which brack-
et the question of the intentionality of decisionmakers; thus, she might not 
endorse the continuum of purposiveness or intentionality we advance here. Id. 
 241. Peter Drahos, Trading in Public Hope, 592 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
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An example of the inadvertent misdirection of hopes might 
be the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.242 This Act engaged 
the hopes of a generation of schoolchildren and their parents, 
particularly children of color and English language learners, by 
promising to improve academic performance and reduce the 
performance gaps between groups.243 But if the Act is inade-
quately funded, or its test-based strategy fails to deliver, or it 
offers children the hope of progress without the means within 
their control to achieve it, the Act may be said to misdirect 
those hopes—or raise them without justification, albeit inad-
vertently.  
An especially forceful legal intervention in the realm of af-
fective experience is the relationship of cultivation. Here law’s 
role is truly ambitious in that it purposefully attempts to bring 
new emotions into being. Scholars such as Martha Minow244 
and Laurel Fletcher245 have investigated the ways that truth 
commissions and tribunals—often operating in conjunction 
with other social processes or initiatives—can foster feelings of 
reconciliation or empathy between former enemies. Our work 
on hope246 examines the role that law can play in fostering this 
crucial, but often neglected, emotion. Focusing on the examples 
of Project Head Start and group litigation involving immigrant 
sweatshop workers, we discuss the steps that lawyers or legally 
created institutions can play in cultivating hope by supporting 
the self-conception, imagination, and agency of groups whose 
circumstances have made it difficult to develop these qualities, 
and by giving them the solidaristic support and resources to 
move deliberately toward larger goals.247 Similarly, Solangel 
Maldonado proposes to cultivate forgiveness by adding special 
procedures to the legal process of divorce.248  
 
SOC. SCI. 18, 24–30 (2004). 
 242. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 
(2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20, 25, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 243. Cf. Anita F. Hill, A History of Hollow Promises: How Choice Jurispru-
dence Fails to Achieve Educational Equality, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 107, 137–
40 (2006) (describing the expectations associated with the Act). 
 244. See MINOW, supra note 62, at 52–90. 
 245. See Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social 
Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 573, 597–601 (2002). 
 246. Abrams & Keren, supra note 63. 
 247. Id. at 345–71. 
 248. Maldonado, supra note 64, at 492–94. 
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Law can also be used to cultivate negative emotions, such 
as the emotions of fear or shame. Law has been used to culti-
vate fear or shame quite intentionally—one might point to laws 
passed restricting the activity, movement, and dress of Jews 
during the early part of the Nazi regime.249 The intensive re-
striction and surveillance of activity promoted an atmosphere 
of fear in Jewish neighborhoods and the requirement to display 
a yellow Star of David conspicuously on clothing produced a 
feeling of stigma and shame in the Jewish population.250 These 
laws had a simultaneous but distinct effect on non-Jews living 
and working in proximate areas: they encouraged non-Jews to 
feel disgust or contempt for those so rigorously marked and regu-
lated.251  
 
 249. For a timeline of restrictive legislation affecting Jews in the first years 
of Hitler’s dictatorship, see United States Holocaust Museum, Examples of 
Antisemitic Legislation, 1933–1939, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php? 
lang=en&ModuleId=10007459 (last visited Apr. 25, 2010). See also Nuremberg 
Laws on Citizenship and Race, September 15, 1935, http://frank.mtsu.edu/~ 
baustin/nurmlaw2.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2010). 
 250. Id. A poignant example of the painfully mixed emotions these regula-
tions inspired in German Jews may be found in a letter from the Organisation 
of Independent Orthodox Communities to Hitler in 1933 asking for a clarifica-
tion of the meaning of the regulations. The letter describes “the position of the 
German Jewry [as] intolerable”; yet it also avows that “[t]he Orthodox Jewry 
is unwilling to abandon the conviction that it is not the aim of the German 
Government to destroy the German Jews.” It states that if the Government 
was “willing to maintain moral Jewry,” the community would “not demand of 
the Government overnight the cancellation of all the regulations affecting 
Jews,” as the community did “not wish to create difficulties for the national 
government.” Memorandum from the Organisation of Independent Orthodox 
Communities to the German Chancellor (Hitler), October 1933, in DOCU-
MENTS ON THE HOLOCAUST: SELECTED SOURCES ON THE DESTRUCTION OF THE 
JEWS OF GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, POLAND, AND THE SOVIET UNION 59–63 
(Yitzhak Arad et al. eds., 1981) [hereinafter Orthodox Community Memoran-
dum]. Although this posture of extreme deference may be a product of the au-
thoritarian structure of German society at the time, it may also reflect the ab-
jection and sense of powerlessness produced in the Jewish community by the 
regulations. We thank Deb Wood for this reference, and this insight.  
 251. For contemporaneous discussions of the purpose and effect of such 
regulations, see Robert Weltsch, Wear It With Pride, The Yellow Badge, JUE-
DISCHE RUNDSCHAU, Apr. 4, 1933 (noting that posting of Magen David sym-
bols on all Jewish businesses was “intended as a brand, a sign of contempt” 
and exhorting Jews to resist it by displaying the symbols with pride). See also 
Orthodox Community Memorandum, supra note 250, at 59–63 (“[T]he position 
of the German Jewry must be perceived as altogether desperate by the most 
objective of observers the world over.”). Recent legal efforts to enact shame-
based sanctions, such as proposals to mark the clothing or residences of con-
victed sexual predators, aspire to cultivate similar emotions, both in their im-
mediate targets and in the broader population. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do 
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 632–33 (1996). 
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But the law may also operate to engender fear without 
such explicit or unitary intention. Jonathan Simon’s recent 
book, Governing Through Crime, makes this kind of point: 
through a range of laws and regulations that seek to combat os-
tensibly pervasive criminality, legal actors have engendered a 
fairly widespread culture of fear.252 Here, enhancing collective 
security by responding to extant or potential criminality may 
be the primary, or most explicit, goal of governmental action.253 
But the related affective production—the engendering of fear in 
a broader population that includes those who are neither cur-
rent nor prospective criminals—may contribute to this goal, or 
may be a not-entirely-unanticipated effect of so comprehensive 
an approach to criminality.254  
Just as decisionmakers may use the law to cultivate or fos-
ter particular emotions, they may also use it to discourage or 
prevent them from emerging in particular settings. Sam Ba-
genstos and Margo Schlanger’s argument against the award of 
hedonic damages is aimed at discouraging pity toward the dis-
abled, which they view as both erroneous and demeaning.255 
Along similar lines, courts—such as the majority in Carhart—
that express concern about post-abortion regret may see them-
selves as trying to prevent the emergence of that emotion in 
women facing difficult reproductive choices.256  
Perhaps the most conclusive impact that law can have on 
the emotions is the effect of destruction. This operation of law 
 
 252. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON 
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF 
FEAR 4–7 (2007).  
 253. See id. at 75. 
 254. See id. at 260–61. 
 255. See Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 82, at 748–52. 
 256. Chris Guthrie’s recent article on regret in the context of abortion 
seems to ascribe this goal to the Court in Carhart. See Guthrie, supra note 80, 
at 877 (citing Judge Kennedy’s reasoning: “While we find no reliable data to 
measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women 
come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sus-
tained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.”). It is possible that 
some decisionmakers crediting this argument are attempting to prevent re-
gret, while others, such as the advocacy organizations involved in soliciting 
women’s narratives, are more interested in preventing abortions, or in script-
ing regret in a way that associates it with the choice to obtain an abortion. 
Robin Toner, Abortion Foes See Validation for New Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, May 
22, 2007, at A1 (describing a conservative foundation’s attempt to document 
over 2000 women’s accounts of post-abortion regret). We see it is as possible 
that a specific legal strategy could have more than one relation to, or effect on, 
particular emotions. 
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on the emotions is often nonpurposive: legally induced affective 
destruction is most frequently a byproduct of failed legal inter-
ventions. Our work with capital lawyers suggests, for example, 
that clients’ hopes can be almost irrevocably destroyed by years 
of incompetent or uncaring representation. 257  Amy Smith’s 
work similarly highlights the destruction of hope by legal 
norms, which deny post-conviction capital prisoners any control 
over the timing of execution, dooming them to extended periods 
of helplessness and uncertainty.258 It is also possible that the 
law can perpetrate emotional destruction through flawed insti-
tutional design. One might think about the kind of affective de-
struction that can be produced by layer upon layer of mind-
deadening bureaucracy. Lucie White underscores these effects 
in Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G.,259 when she presents a 
client’s unexpected emotional resilience in the face of such bu-
reaucracy as a puzzle or a miracle; we might ask how many 
more people have been emotionally depleted by a life lived 
within such legal structures. One can only hope that this kind 
of destruction is not the result of purposive design by legal ac-
tors. 
Thus, the law may embody a range of potential relations to 
the emotions, from relations such as expression, which produce 
little or no change in the emotion itself, through more active 
forms of engagement, such as channeling, containment, or 
management, to relations capable of bringing emotions into be-
ing or the reverse, such as scripting, cultivation, or destruction.  
b. Uses of the Framework 
This framework serves, first, to highlight the fact that law 
is already actively engaged in shaping the emotions—whether 
or not legal scholars or actors recognize it. The framework dem-
onstrates many ways in which law may produce “affective ex-
ternalities”: effects on the emotions that stem from legal ac-
tions undertaken for other reasons. These may be wholly 
unintended (such as the misdirected hopes of No Child Left Be-
hind)260 or partially anticipated but not the primary goal of 
 
 257. Interview with Lis Semel & Ty Alper, Univ. of Cal. Berkeley School of 
Law Death Penalty Clinic, in Berkeley, Cal. (Nov. 16, 2006) (on file with au-
thors).  
 258. Smith, supra note 140, at 238. 
 259. Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sun-
day Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 32 (1990). 
 260. See supra notes 242–43. 
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regulation (such as the scripting of romance as taboo in the 
workplace under sexual harassment law).261 The framework al-
so demonstrates that there are cases in which legal actors quite 
purposively have undertaken to shape the emotions of those in 
a particular context—transitional justice regimes following 
mass violence is one example—though conventional commit-
ment to legal rationality may make it difficult for us to perceive 
legal action in this way. 
For scholars whose goal is to ameliorate the functioning of 
the law, this framework may highlight the affective conse-
quences of particular doctrinal choices—both intended and un-
intended—and permit scholars to contemplate doctrinal revi-
sion. Doctrinal questions will rarely be formulated in explicitly 
affective terms, even when emotions are directly implicated. 
For example, Carhart is, strictly speaking, about the constitu-
tionality, under due process, of a federal statute prohibiting one 
form of late-term abortion.262 The above framework helps to 
demonstrate that the case may also be described as being about 
the effects of particular legal rules on the emotions of guilt or 
regret.  
Even more importantly, the framework helps legal ana-
lysts contemplating normative recommendations to reflect on 
what kind of legal response is appropriate to produce specific 
effects on particular emotions. For example, the framework 
helps us see that the Court, or the state, claims to be prevent-
ing the emergence of guilt or regret among women contemplat-
ing abortion;263 but it may also (or instead) be scripting guilt or 
regret, so that women associate it with the choice to obtain an 
abortion. Once we understand these potential relations we can 
ask more explicitly normative questions about what the law 
should be doing in the future. If we credit the government’s 
goal of preventing guilt or regret, we can ask what kinds of so-
lutions—from providing specific information before the proce-
dure, to restricting access to any or all abortion procedures that 
might cause it—reflect the most plausible alternatives for 
achieving this goal. If we believe this doctrine also, or primari-
ly, affects the scripting of regret, we can ask whether the risk of 
negative emotions can be reframed in less portentous terms, or 
whether the affective costs of providing such information out-
weigh its ostensible benefits. 
 
 261. See Schultz, supra note 240, at 2079–84. 
 262. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132–33 (2007). 
 263. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
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The same framework can also be used for thinking through 
legal challenges that implicate legal representation or policy, or 
have not yet crystallized into a case. For example, if a capital 
attorney is troubled by the problem of excessive volunteering or 
suicide on death row, then she might explore forms of legal rep-
resentation that cultivate or at least manage hope. Similarly, if 
legal actors are concerned with the impoverishment of children 
that may follow a particularly hostile divorce, they may be in-
terested in reforms, such as those examined by Solangel Mal-
donado, that help to cultivate forgiveness or channel rage.  
For scholars who begin not with the analysis of a legal 
problem, but with the analysis of an emotion, or for scholars 
whose goal is to use law to affect emotions in particular ways, 
this framework may offer illustrative normative possibilities. 
The relations elaborated above highlight possible ways that law 
can affect emotions; the examples of scholarship associated 
with each help to illustrate the kinds of legal strategies through 
which such influence has been, or can be, accomplished. Robert 
Solomon explains how vengeance is cooled, rationalized, or sa-
tisfied through certain features of the criminal law.264 Dan Ka-
han demonstrates how shame might be fostered by alternative 
criminal sanctions.265 Similarly, we show how programs such as 
Head Start have successfully cultivated hope in the parents of 
students.266 So when legal scholars begin to focus on an emo-
tion that they believe might play a salutary role in a particular 
context, they can draw on a body of work that reflects the range 
of things that law can do and offers some more instrumental 
guidance.  
2. Normative Means 
If law and emotions scholars approach the normative di-
mension of their work with the goals of enhancing the opera-
tion of law, and ameliorating the affective lives of those who 
live under it, what are the means that they use to advance 
these goals? In the remainder of this Part, we explore four in-
strumentalities that law and emotions scholars have used to 
forward their normative aims: doctrinal revision, institutional 
design, rhetorical and deliberative strategies, and programmat-
 
 264. See Solomon, supra note 61, at 127–31. 
 265. See Kahan, supra note 251, at 605–30. 
 266. See Abrams & Keren, supra note 63, at 363. 
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ic/policy initiatives.267 Each of these approaches demonstrates 
that affective analysis can fuel productive legal action. 
a. Doctrinal Revision 
The first, and most familiar, normative means deployed by 
law and emotions scholars is doctrinal revision. Scholars have 
advocated changes in doctrine in a wide range of substantive 
fields, from contract law,268 to constitutional law,269 to statuto-
rily based securities,270 or tort law.271 Scholars argue that doc-
trine is flawed either because it is based on a flawed under-
standing of the emotions, or it fails completely to apprehend the 
operation of emotion in the specific legal context: in either case, 
the answer is revision of the doctrine to encompass the relevant 
affective knowledge.  
Hila Keren argues, for example, that contract law misun-
derstands the emotions that animate gratuitous promises. Far 
from reflecting a realm of self-sacrifice that is distant from mar-
ket relations, the emotions that animate altruism afford benefits 
to the giver that are importantly comparable to the benefits of 
market transactions.272 This understanding demands a change 
in doctrine: some gratuitous promises should be enforced for 
many of the same reasons applicable to contracts formed in the 
market.273 And in the abortion context, Jeremy Blumenthal ar-
gues that the Casey Court’s concern about factually misleading 
 
 267. This ordering moves from the narrowest and most concrete kinds of 
legal proposals to the most global or ambitious. 
 268. E.g., Keren, supra note 114, at 25–27. 
 269. E.g., Blumenthal, supra note 145, at 1; Guthrie, supra note 80, at 882. 
 270. See Huang, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 66, at 6; Huang, 
Regulating Irrational Exuberance, supra note 66, at 518. 
 271. E.g., Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 82, at 774. 
 272. See Keren, supra note 92 (manuscript at 12–13). 
 273. Chris Guthrie argues, similarly, that the Court’s decision in Carhart 
is based on a misunderstanding of the focal emotion of regret. Guthrie, supra 
note 80, at 877. Regret is, in fact, better avoided, rationalized, and learned 
from than the Court appears to believe, rendering it a minimal danger to 
women contemplating reproductive choices. Id. at 881–82. Thus, as Guthrie 
argues, the flawed reasoning of Carhart should not be extended, either to oth-
er abortion contexts, or to other constitutional contexts implicating choice in 
the exercise of protected rights. Id. at 882. Additionally, Sam Bagenstos and 
Margo Schlanger argue that the award of hedonic damages in tort cases in-
volving disability misapprehends the affective experience of the recently dis-
abled: most experience a substantial return of their subjective well-being as 
they adjust to their disabilities. Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 82, at 
774–75. This revised affective understanding supports the elimination of he-
donic damages in the context of tort cases involving the disabled. Id.  
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information in informed consent exchanges fails completely to 
recognize that information can be factually correct but affective-
ly misleading, or distortive of women’s decisionmaking 
processes, as well. The answer, again, is to change the doctrine 
and to interpret Casey in a way that responds to both kinds of 
threats to women’s reproductive decisionmaking.274 Terry Ma-
roney argues that emotional as well as cognitive capacities af-
fect criminal defendants’ ability to make the decisions neces-
sary to participate in their own defenses.275 After examining 
these affective dimensions of competence and explaining how 
they bear on defense-related decisionmaking,276 she proposes 
modifying the Dusky standard for assessing competence to 
stand trial, 277  to encompass emotional as well as cognitive 
measures of the “rational understanding” necessary to estab-
lish decisional competence.278 
b. Institutional Competency or Design 
Other scholars engaged in affective analysis have focused 
not on doctrine but on questions of institutional competency or 
design. What they have learned about the role of emotions in 
the decisionmaking process leads them to a conclusion about 
the optimal decisionmaker in a particular legal context. As we 
saw above, Cass Sunstein’s concern with flawed heuristics in 
risk assessment leads him to delegate certain forms of such as-
sessment to experts who have been schooled to avoid such re-
liance.279 Dan Kahan, on the other hand, relies on a different 
 
 274. See Blumenthal, supra note 145, at 11–12. 
 275. Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, “Rational Understanding,” 
and the Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1376 (2006). 
 276. Id. at 1400–25. 
 277. Id. at 1425–33. In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) 
(per curiam), the Supreme Court articulated the applicable standard for adju-
dicative competency. It held that a defendant is competent to stand trial when 
he has “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding.” Id. 
 278. Maroney, supra note 275, at 1399–425. She also argues, more specifi-
cally, that psychological and neurological testing might be added to the screen-
ing tools, such as the MacCAT-CA (MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool—
Criminal Assessment), which are already used to assess cognitive competence. 
These tools can identify competence-affecting emotional disorders stemming 
from two kinds of problems: depression and related mood-altering psychologi-
cal conditions and “Gage matrix” disorder stemming from organic brain dam-
age in the area of the frontal cortex. Id. at 1425–31. 
 279. SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 64–88. An emphasis on institutional 
competency or institutional design is another normative feature that some be-
havioral law and economics scholars share with law and emotions work. Sun-
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view of emotions to argue against Sunstein’s proposal.280 Emo-
tions, he argues, are not forces that fuel departures from ra-
tional decisionmaking; rather they are “judgments of value”281 
that help us perceive a larger worldview that orients us toward 
risk. Because all of us, whatever our training, read risk as-
sessment data according to our worldviews, rather than adjust-
ing our worldviews to risk assessment data, efforts to avoid the 
influence of emotion through reliance on experts are likely to be 
unavailing.282 The goal of legal policy should instead be to edu-
cate laypersons about the evaluative power of their emotions, 
and to frame policy alternatives in ways that demonstrate their 
responsiveness to a range of worldviews.283  
A comparable view of emotion and expertise animates Doni 
Gewirtzman’s understanding of constitutional decisionmak-
ing.284 In what we have called the illumination dimension of his 
work, Gewirtzman observes that emotion has historically been 
treated as anathema to sound constitutional decisionmaking—
as a matter of both constitutional theory and institutional ar-
rangements.285 However, in his investigative work he uses re-
cent psychological research to demonstrate that emotion is 
integral to two attributes we consider essential to functioning 
 
stein and his sometime-collaborator Richard Thaler, for example, have placed 
great emphasis on certain institutional design issues they refer to as the “ar-
chitecture of choice.” THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 84, at 81. This architec-
ture involves, for example, selecting defaults that maximize those choices that 
the government sees as rational or as maximizing citizens’ well-being. Id. 
 280. Kahan, supra note 85, at 749–53.  
 281. Id. at 750 (citing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: 
THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 19 (2001)).  
 282. Id. at 748–52. 
 283. Id. at 764–65. According to Kahan: 
Historically, the view that emotions are “judgments of value” has also 
been affiliated with the position that emotions can be educated. The 
type of instruction this approach contemplates, however, consists not 
in a stoic program of disciplining the mind and strengthening the will 
to resist the supposedly corrupting influence of emotion on judgment. 
Instead, it has involved a species of moral instruction that reforms a 
person’s emotional apprehension of the social meanings that unjust or 
destructive states of affairs and courses of action express.  
(citing NUSSBAUM, supra note 281, at 218–20, 233, 425–33). But see Peter 
Huang, Diverse Conceptions of Emotions in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 435, 437 (2008), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/response 
.php?rid=40. 
 284. Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings: Emotion, Commitment, 
and Imagination in Constitutional Culture, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 623, 625–26 
(2009). 
 285. Id. at 635–44. 
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constitutionalism: commitment and imagination.286 This gives 
members of the lay citizenry, in whom such emotions flourish, 
valuable resources to contribute to ongoing constitutional ref-
lection, deliberation, and revision.287 Eventually, at the integra-
tion level, Gewirtzman uses this understanding to buttress a 
burgeoning theoretical interest in popular constitutionalism, 
and to question the historical primacy of the judiciary in consti-
tutional decisionmaking.288  
c. Rhetorical and Deliberative Strategies 
Understanding the affective dimensions of a problem can 
also fuel new rhetorical strategies, or approaches to structuring 
public debate. In some contexts, scholars have asked whether 
debates should be framed in affective (as opposed to rational) 
terms, or whether particular emotions should play a prominent 
role in legal argument. Douglas Berman and Stephanos Bibas 
have argued, for example, that grasping the ways that emotions 
infuse the death penalty should persuade abolitionists to frame 
their opposition in affective—as opposed to dispassionate—
terms. 289  Martha Nussbaum and Dan Kahan have debated 
whether the emotion of disgust should animate the rhetoric, 
structure the sanctions, or more generally, direct the enforce-
ment of criminal law.290  
In other cases, affective understanding points to a new 
frame or structure for public debate. Dan Kahan and Donald 
Braman have argued that understanding positions on gun con-
trol as a function of “cultural worldview”291 rather than rational 
 
 286. Id. at 632–35. 
 287. Id. at 670. 
 288. Id. at 679–81. 
 289. See Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging Capital Emotions, 
102 N.W. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 355, 360–61 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern 
.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/17/LRColl2008n17Berman&Bibas.pdf. 
 290. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 53, at 70; Nussbaum, supra note 58, at 19.  
 291. Kahan’s “cultural theory of risk perception” is not exclusively an emo-
tional theory. He argues that people assess risks not as rational actors, but as 
individuals with a particular cultural orientation, which embodies a specific 
set of moral values and societal aspirations. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 
214, at 1294–95. This cultural view of risk is not modified by empirical evi-
dence; rather, one’s cultural orientation determines what risks, and what em-
pirical evidence regarding risks, one takes as salient. Id. at 1295–99. However, 
emotions are directly implicated in the theory because they provide the per-
ceptual cues to what one values; that is, they aid in one’s perception of the 
elements of her cultural orientation. See Kahan, supra note 85, at 744–48. We 
consider Kahan’s theory to be closer to a law and emotions theory than behav-
ioral law and economics because its goal is not to correct decisionmaking be-
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risk assessment should change our strategy for approaching 
disputes about gun control regulation. Policymakers have often 
assumed that we need more empirical information about the 
relative risks related to different levels of regulating gun pos-
session. Yet, Kahan and Braman contend, if one’s cultural 
orientation292 determines one’s response to empirical evidence, 
rather than vice-versa, we need not more evidence, but rather a 
form of democratic exchange that permits us to articulate, and 
openly discuss, means of reconciling competing worldviews, in-
cluding the emotions they comprise.293 Attending to affectively 
infused cultural positions, rather than relying on neutral liber-
al dialogue about evidence, may prevent the kinds of delibera-
tive breakdown, and harsh affective fallout, that currently in-
fects the debate.294  
d. Policy and Programmatic Design 
Analysis of the emotions can also inform normative pro-
posals in a final area: policy assessment or programmatic de-
sign. Some scholars have used the effect on emotion as a crit-
erion for retrospective assessment of the efficacy of specific 
legal or governmental programs. This kind of assessment has 
been prominent in studies of transitional justice, where scho-
lars such as Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein have asked 
about the extent to which legal regimes facilitate the gradual 
restoration of trust or a sense of common purpose among 
neighbors who have become enemies.295 We have asked, in the 
 
havior so that it more closely resembles that of the rational actor. Rather, it is 
to transform our understanding of motivation and decisionmaking in a way 
that makes central those dimensions of self-understanding and choice that re-
flect a role for affect, and are not readily comprehended by assumptions of ra-
tionality.  
 292. Kahan and Braman rely, for example, on paradigmatic cultural orien-
tations, such as authoritarian, egalitarian, or individualist. See Kahan & 
Braman, supra note 214, at 1297. 
 293. Id. at 1324 (“No amount of econometrics or cost-benefit analysis can 
tell us how to respond to these risk appraisals; only a frank and open discus-
sion of the competing worldviews that sponsor them can.”). 
 294. Id. at 1318. Kahan and Braman’s argument does not revolve around a 
simple opposition between emotion and rationality: the current, flawed version 
of the gun-control debate features both unhelpful empirical rationality, and 
pointless affective mudslinging. Their argument is, rather, about the ways 
that acknowledging the affectively infused, value driven dimensions of risk 
assessment can integrate emotion and cultural norms in a more productive 
form of discussion that takes its bearings from worldviews rather than from 
empirical evidence. Id. 
 295. Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 245, at 617–35. 
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context of educational policy, what features can make legislated 
programs suitable for cultivating the hopes of children and 
their parents, where hope is understood as the ability to con-
ceive and work toward the realization of challenging, long-term 
goals.296 We then suggested a framework for a cultivation of 
hope which includes guidelines for engaging in such an ef-
fort.297  
Scholars whose work has highlighted the value (or the 
danger) of particular emotions may devise specific policies that 
are aimed at fostering (or ameliorating) them. This has been a 
vital recent focus in the area of family law. Solangel Maldona-
do, working on the emotion of forgiveness, has advocated the 
use of “forgiveness education” programs which assist family 
members in ventilating and processing anger, and moving to a 
posture of greater acceptance and mutual engagement.298 Courts 
can expand recourse to such programs by ordering participation 
in the context of legal proceedings such as divorces.299 Clare 
Huntington’s recent work also includes several examples of af-
fectively driven policy proposals. In her work on “repair” she 
suggested substantive changes such as creating the status of 
“coparent” to recognize relationships that continue after rup-
ture,300 and process-based changes such as the use of collabora-
tive law, family group conferencing, mediation, and parenting 
coordinators.301  All these changes better reflect the complex 
cycles of love, anger, guilt, and repair that, according to her 
analysis, infuse intact family life as well as divorce.302  
3. Normative Concerns  
Doctrinal or programmatic initiatives which reflect an af-
firmative role for law, or for the state, in cultivating, scripting, 
or more generally shaping, the emotions have tended to pro-
voke the wariest response from readers and commentators. 
This kind of normative work draws the fears about intrusive 
 
 296. Abrams & Keren, supra note 63, at 320–22. 
 297. Id. at 344–60. 
 298. Maldonado, supra note 64, at 483. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Huntington, supra note 64, at 1303–04. 
 301. Id. at 1305. 
 302. Id. at 1304–05. In an even more ambitious work, Huntington argues 
that a notion of “family flourishing,” drawn from the emerging field of positive 
psychology, should become the metric for assessing a range of contending fam-
ily law policies. See Clare Huntington, Happy Families? Translating Positive 
Psychology into Family Law, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 385, 401 (2009). 
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state intervention, or the manufacturing of sham emotions that 
we surveyed earlier.303 Though a full treatment of such reser-
vations is beyond the scope of this Article, we will conclude 
with some thoughts that aim to place these concerns in pers-
pective. 
First, it is important to acknowledge the normative moti-
vations of many who engage in law and emotions scholarship. 
Here, again, the comparison to behavioral law and economics, 
with its focus on description and its ambivalence about making 
normative recommendations for legal interventions, comes to 
mind. It is not surprising that traditional law and economics 
scholars who strongly believe in homo economicus, such as Ri-
chard Posner, have attacked the behavioral law and economics 
project as being “useless.”304 It is more remarkable that contrib-
utors to the project have expressed internal resistance to nor-
mative moves. Gregory Mitchell, for example, has warned that 
normative engagement will “convert the government into an ir-
rationality monitor” and sound the death-knell of behavioral 
law and economics by making it “a political movement rather 
than a scientific endeavor.”305 Within the behavioral project, 
even scholars who are less opposed to prescriptive work often 
find themselves equivocal about the normative import of their 
 
 303. Another reservation, which Clare Huntington explores, is that such 
normative initiatives are drawn from interdisciplinary work that is largely de-
scriptive in its focus. See Huntington, supra note 64, at 1258. This appears to 
be more of an internal critique, raised by those working within the law and 
emotions field to clarify their enterprise, rather than an external critique, of-
fered to problematize the normative dimension of the project. Huntington tries 
to answer this critique, suggesting that certain means of deploying such 
work—for example using the notion of flourishing derived from positive psy-
chology as a metric for assessing broad visions and specific policies within the 
field of family law—mitigates this problem, at least to some degree. See Hun-
tington, supra note 302, at 387. This appears to be so because this kind of ap-
proach uses a (positive) descriptive theory as a standard, rather than translat-
ing it into specific normative programs when it is, in and of itself, normatively 
indeterminate. 
 304. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the 
Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1560–61 (1998). 
 305. Mitchell, supra note 88, at 1811. Mitchell’s arguments presented a 
challenge to the movement and induced a debate. For a reply to Mitchell, see 
Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law 
and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1670 (2003) (arguing that the beha-
vioral law and economics movement “retains great potential to add valuable 
insights to legal scholarship, despite Mitchell’s withering attack” on the 
movement). Interestingly, Mitchell himself has recently published a co-
authored article in which the behavioral law and economics analysis is self-
defined as containing both descriptive and normative arguments. See Adam J. 
Hirsch & Gregory Mitchell, Law and Proximity, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 557, 559.  
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analysis.306 Thus, as a general matter, behavioral law and eco-
nomics has prompted far fewer objections on the ground of ex-
cessive intervention. 
Law and emotions scholarship may be greeted with suspi-
cion by some scholars—such as those described above—simply 
because it increasingly reflects normative motivations.307 But 
this pattern explains only part of the resistance. Legal scholar-
ship is, by and large, a normative enterprise.308 This suggests 
that the mainstream scholars may be responding, in part, to 
the characteristics of, or the kinds of, normativity that are 
emerging as part of law and emotions analysis. The forms of 
normativity that are being proposed are, as the discussion 
above suggests, far-ranging and various. They are not easily ca-
tegorized, but they are unlikely to be confined to such goals as 
correcting human behavior in the direction of rationality, or 
providing decisionmaking “architecture” to encourage rational 
choice.309  
This variety itself may seem unmanageable to some main-
stream scholars, or may prompt fears of excessive legal inter-
vention. Moreover, the motivations for normativity in this work 
go beyond (although they may also include) a desire to improve 
the functioning of the law. Normative proposals may be ani-
mated by a desire to cultivate, script, or otherwise shape emo-
tions. Both the emotions, as a target of legal effort, and the de-
sire to influence them, as a goal, may appear less objective and 
more “political” (in the sense of particularistic or partial) than 
other normative interventions that aim to improve the law. Fi-
nally, while normative proposals emerging from law and emo-
tions analysis may sometimes counsel law or legal actors to do 
less—one may think, for example, of Bagenstos’s and Schlang-
er’s critique of hedonic damages, or Bandes’s critique of victim 
impact statements—they also frequently envision a larger role 
 
 306. Prentice later wrote about the unenforceability of gratuitous promises 
in contract law. See Robert A. Prentice, “Law &” Gratuitous Promises, 2007 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 881. He concluded by saying about behavioral law and economics 
(BLE): “Although BLE analysis makes a very forceful case that the traditional 
arguments, even as enhanced by economic understanding, cannot justify treat-
ing gratuitous promises differently from bargained-for promises, BLE ulti-
mately does not justify overturning the common law’s time-honored conclusion 
that gift promises should not be enforced.” Id. at 937. 
 307. See supra notes 295–306 and accompanying text. 
 308. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 309. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
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for law, and they assume the interpenetration of law with other 
institutional, social, and cultural forces.  
None of these qualities, however, make legal interventions 
that aim to produce emotional effects pernicious (or, for that 
matter, salutary) as a category. Critiques that view them in 
such broad terms may reflect the resurfacing of a dichotomized 
approach to emotion and reason (affectively based grounds for 
legal intervention are suspect), or a resurgent objectivism 
(scholarship which is “scientific” is preferable to scholarship 
which is “political”), more than a response to a specific type of 
normative intervention. Similar to the “anti-anti-paternalism” 
message of the more normatively oriented behavioral law and 
economics—which challenged the sweeping resistance of law 
and economics to legal interventions in private decisions310—
the law and emotions movement has convincingly demonstrat-
ed the fallacy of comprehensive objection to affectively moti-
vated interventions.  
Law and emotions scholarship has also, within its own 
terms, responded to many of the specific objections that critics 
have raised. To see emotion as the sanctum sanctorum of hu-
man personality; to see it as a separate realm, untouchable by 
the impersonal hand of the law; or to see it as either pure and 
authentic or as a sham response to state demands, neglects 
many of the insights that burgeoning research into the emo-
tions has produced. It neglects the deep intertwining of emotion 
with other forms of cognition. And it neglects the social situa-
tedness of emotion: the ways in which our affective responses—
as potent signals of what we value311—are continually being 
shaped and informed by the responses of others, and by social 
and cultural norms.312 Finally, these anxieties ignore the point, 
underscored by law and emotions work itself, that a range of 
current legal interventions do, in fact, produce emotional ef-
fects, whether such effects are wholly incidental, vaguely antic-
ipated, or purposefully contemplated. 
All this being said, particular interventions in the emotions 
may be good or bad, promising or ominous—or many combina-
 
 310. See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1178 (1997) (arguing against libertarian antipaternalism); see also Blu-
menthal, supra note 4, at 56. 
 311. See Kahan, supra note 85, at 774; Nussbaum, supra note 58, at 26. 
 312. See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text. See generally Bandes, 
supra note 120, at 17–22 (describing the effect that the failure to embrace the 
role of emotion in the law has had on the capital system). 
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tions of these. They demand assessment, but as specific norma-
tive proposals, rather than as a comprehensive category of legal 
action. There are questions we might propose to promote more 
useful forms of discussion about particular normative interven-
tions in the emotions.  
When evaluating a potential intervention, we may want to 
think first about the character of the emotion in question.313 We 
may find it worth sustaining risks of inappropriate interference 
if we find the emotion in question worthy of cultivation, or par-
ticularly promising in a specific context. Similarly, legal action 
may seem warranted where the emotion is potentially damag-
ing enough—particularly in a specific setting—to warrant 
management, channeling, or other amelioration. Anger, re-
sentment, or distrust among neighbors in a suburban housing 
development, or between neighborhoods battling over a locally 
undesirable land use, may not strike us as demanding legal in-
tervention aimed at the emotions; but anger, distrust, or re-
sentment among neighbors in Bosnia may prompt a different 
response. Some emotions may also strike us as less public, or 
more intimate—and they may, therefore, induce greater cau-
tion when they are proposed as targets for legal intervention. 
We may feel less concerned about having our retributive urges 
cooled through law, for example, than having our love scripted 
by the state. 
However, a large part of what determines whether we find 
a legal intervention promising or ominous—from the stand-
point of either mind control or generation of sham emotions—is 
the manner or process through which it occurs. One question 
we may want to ask of such interventions is the extent to which 
they entail transparency about their affective goals or impacts: 
we may feel most subject to manipulation when the law, broad-
ly defined, acts on our emotions without making clear what it is 
doing, or without our being aware of its affective impact. It is 
not always possible to make such effects accessible to all those 
who may be influenced. But, frank discussion of why hope 
should be cultivated or why the possibility of regret is serious 
enough to justify the intervention of the state may foster valu-
able discussion and serve to calm anxieties of this sort.  
A second question which may be important is whether le-
gal approaches condition specific legal consequences on the 
 
 313. Clare Huntington makes the point with respect to state-based norm 
entrepreneurship that proceeds via the emotions. See Huntington, supra note 
81 (manuscript at 40). 
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manifestation of particular emotions. Many of the most trouble-
some examples raised by critics—from Carol Sanger’s concern 
with the regret of teenagers seeking abortions,314 to Austin Sa-
rat’s worry about the remorse of those entering sentencing pro-
ceedings315—concern this kind of legal demand to perform emo-
tion, on pain of punishment or of losing some significant 
benefit. Interventions that simply seek to engender emotions, 
without conditioning legal consequences on their manifestation, 
may be less intrusive, and may raise fewer concerns about gen-
erating inauthentic affective responses. 
In the realm of process considerations, it may also be use-
ful to think about the specific legal actor, or the level of gov-
ernment responsible for implementing the intervention. 316 
Head Start may have been a better vehicle than No Child Left 
Behind for cultivating hope, partially because it was adminis-
tered through local centers, which had programmatic discretion 
and could respond to the affective and other needs of particular 
constituencies. One-size-fits-all efforts to induce affective re-
sponse, or interventions undertaken at a governmental level 
which is distant from subjects’ (affective) lives seem to raise 
more serious concerns.  
When these are the questions that are framed and ans-
wered, it becomes clear that interventions aimed at shaping af-
fective response are not so distinctive or anomalous. Some in-
terventions may seem problematic; others more innocuous, or 
even beneficial. They prompt questions about substance, 
process, and level of government charged with implementa-
tion—much like many other kinds of legal intervention. And 
the body of scholarly thought that informs them and debates 
their merits is a pragmatic, normatively oriented legal endea-
vor, like many which have received wider recognition in legal 
scholarship. 
  CONCLUSION   
This inquiry brings us full circle to the original insight of 
law and emotions scholarship, which was not simply a chal-
lenge to legal rationality, but an appreciation of the vital role of 
the emotions in human life and in the life of the law. The emer-
 
 314. Sanger, supra note 110, at 111.  
 315. Sarat, supra note 51, at 159–63.  
 316. See Rachel F. Moran, The Politics of Discretion: Federal Intervention 
in Bilingual Education, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1249, 1331–51 (1988). We are grateful 
to Rachel Moran for bringing this issue to our attention. 
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gence of neighboring fields of analysis that permit us to com-
prehend the limits on rationality is a valuable and illuminating 
contribution; but it is not enough. Legal thought requires an 
understanding of emotions not simply as defects of rationality, 
but also as a distinctive mode of apprehending and navigating 
the world around us. Developing this understanding requires a 
body of work which draws on a breadth of humanistic and (so-
cial) scientific knowledge, which brings that knowledge to spe-
cific legal problems by integrating it into practical solutions, 
whose utility follows many distinct paths and can be communi-
cated to and adopted by a range of legal actors. So who’s afraid 
of law and the emotions? No one should be. 
 
